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IR Theory, Historical Materialism and the False 
Promise of International Historical Sociology1 
                               Benno Teschke 
ABSTRACT 
The three-decades old call for an inter-disciplinary rapprochement 
between IR Theory and Historical Sociology, starting in the context of the post-
positivist debate in the 1980s, has generated a proliferating repertory of 
contending paradigms within the field of IR, including Neo-Weberian, Post-
Structuralist, and Constructivist approaches. Within the Marxist literature, this 
project comprises an equally rich and diverse set of theoretical traditions, 
including World-Systems Theory, Neo-Gramscian IR/IPE, the Amsterdam School, 
Political Marxism, Neo-Leninism, and Postcolonial Theory. More recently, a “third 
wave” of approaches has been announced from within the field of IR, suggesting 
to move the dialogue from inter-disciplinarity towards an integrated super-
discipline of International Historical Sociology (IHS). This proposition has been 
most persistently advanced by advocates of the theory of Uneven and Combined 
Development (UCD), claiming to constitute a universal, unitary and sociological 
theory of IR. This article charts the intellectual trajectory of this ongoing IR/HS 
dialogue. It moves from a critique of Neo-Weberianism to a critique of UCD 
against the background of the original promise of the turn in IR to Historical 
Sociology: the supersession of the prevailing rationalism, structuralism, and 
positivism in extant mainstream IR approaches through the mobilization of 
alternative and non-positivistic traditions in the social sciences. This critique will 
be performed by setting UCD in dialogue with Political Marxism. By anchoring 
both approaches at opposite ends on the spectrum of Marxist conceptions of 
social science – respectively the scientistic and the historicist - the argument is 
that UCD reneges on the promise of Historical Sociology for IR by re-aligning, first 
by default and now by design, with the meta-theoretical premises of Neo-Realism. 
This is most visibly expressed in the articulation of a deductive-nomological 
covering law, leading towards acute conceptual and ontological anachronisms, 
premised on the radical de-historicisation of the fields of ontology, conceptuality 
and disciplinarity. This includes the semantic neutering and hyper-abstract re-
                                                          
1 This article is a longer version of a keynote speech delivered on 2 November 2012 at the METU, 
Ankara, at the occasion of an international conference on “IR Theory, Historical Sociology, and Historical 
Materialism”. I would like to thank the organiser of this conference, Dr. Faruk Yalvac, for the invitation, 
comments and patience. I would also like to acknowledge the discussions with and comments by Samuel 
Knafo, Steffan-Wyn Jones, Clemens Hoffmann, Can Cemgil, Matthieu Hughes, Maia Pal, Frederick 
Guillaume Dufour, Frantz Gheller, Alexander Crawford, Nancy Turgeon, Gonzalo Pozo-Martin, Ben 
Selwyn, Julian Germann, Alejandro Colas, Hannes Lacher, Ray Kiely, Jan Selby, Zdenek Kavan, Dylan 
Riley, and the wider members of the Sussex Political Marxism Research Group. A special 
acknowledgment is due to Justin Rosenberg. Our intellectual trajectories have diverged over the years 
and we have agreed to disagree on key elements of Marxism, Historical Sociology, and IR Theory. I 
would like to extend a warm note of gratitude to Professor Lars Bo Kaspersen, who invited me to spend 
the year 2013/14 as a Visiting Professor at the Department of Political Science at the University of 
Copenhagen, enabling the completion of this article. 
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articulation of the very category, which in IR’s self-perception lends legitimacy to 
its claim of disciplinary distinctiveness: the international. The article concludes by 
suggesting that an understanding of Marxism as a historicist social science 
subverts all calls for the construction of grand theories and, a fortiori, a unitary 
super-discipline of IHS, premised on a set of universal, space-time indifferent, and 
abstract categories that hold across the spectrum of world history. In contrast, 
recovering the historicist credentials of Marxism demands a constant 
temporalisation and specification of the fields of ontology, agency, conceptuality 
and disciplinarity. The objective is to lay the foundations for a historicist social 
science of geopolitics. 
Keywords: Historical Materialism and IR Theory, International 
Historical Sociology (IHS), Neo-Weberianism, Uneven and Combined Development 
(UCD), Political Marxism (PM), Scientism vs Historicism   
 
Introduction: International Historical Sociology and the Post-
Positivist IR Debate 
For over three decades now, the idea to reconvene the field of 
International Relations (IR) in terms of Historical Sociology (HS) and to redefine 
the field of HS in terms of IR, moving from an initial rapprochement and a more 
synthetic inter-disciplinarity towards an integrated super-discipline of International 
Historical Sociology (IHS), has constituted a formidable research desideratum 
beset with demanding and apparently insuperable theoretical difficulties. This 
challenge, to the degree that it is taken seriously, affects not only the main 
theoretical traditions within Rationalist IR – (Neo-)Realism and (Neo)Liberalism – 
and the wider field of HS – Neo-Weberianism, Constructivism, Post-Structuralism 
and Post-Colonialism. It also pertains to the proliferating and contending IR 
approaches within the tradition of Historical Materialism (HM), including World-
Systems Theory, Neo-Gramscian IPE, the Amsterdam School, Uneven and 
Combined Development (UCD) and Political Marxism (PM). 
This article takes stock of the IR/HS debate to establish the basic 
intellectual parameters that frame and inform the controversies around the 
question of IHS. It focuses specifically on how IR approaches informed by HM 
have tried to resolve this puzzle. This leads directly into long-standing 
controversies around the multiple and competing self-understandings of Marxism 
as a social science. To organise the material and to help the reader through an 
occasionally dense argument, the article starts by recalling a fundamental 
philosophical divide that runs through the wider Marxist tradition, which was once 
referred to as the “Two Marxisms”, respectively “Critical Marxism” and “Scientific 
Marxism”. Alvin Gouldner suggested that the Marxist debates in the 1970s and 
1980s between these two orientations were themselves a replay of and reached 
right back into very real philosophical antinomies in Marx’s own work. For “the 
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Two Marxisms could not emerge as structurally distinct tendencies but for the fact 
that both are truly present in Marxism”.2 
 “Critical Marxists (or Hegelianizers) conceive of Marxism as critique rather 
than science; they stress the continuity of Marx with Hegel, the importance of the 
young Marx, the ongoing significance of the young Marx’s emphasis on 
“alienation”, and are more historicist. The scientific Marxists, or anti-Hegelians, 
have (at times) stressed that Marx made a coupure épistemologique with Hegel 
after 1845. Marxism for them is science, not critique, entailing a “structuralist” 
methodology whose paradigm is the “mature” political economy of Capital rather 
than the “ideologized” anthropology of the 1844 Manuscripts (…). Critical and 
Scientific Marxisms differ, then, in their most basic background assumptions: in 
their epistemologies, especially with respect to the role of science as against 
critique, and with respect to their domain assumptions concerning the 
fundamental nature of social reality (i.e. their social ontologies). Critical Marxists 
stress an historicism that emphasises social fluidity and change, a kind of 
organicism calling for the contextual interpretation of events; Scientific Marxists 
search out firm social structures that recur and which are presumably intelligible 
in decontextualized ways”. 3 
This stylised but graphic rendition remains helpful for the purposes of this 
article as this constitutive divide between scientism and historicism resurfaces also 
in the extant theoretical literature in the IR/HS debate and cuts, it will be argued, 
across the Marxist/non-Marxist divide. The distinction between scientism and 
historicism encapsulates thus very different conceptions of social science and the 
conduct of research. The former seeks to formulate transhistorical or mid-range 
covering laws, general and abstract categories of analyses, objective and 
structural determinations and imperatives, stable ontologies, and essentialised 
rationalities. It pursues the construction of grand theories, which hold ideally 
independently of time and space. The latter calls for a historicisation of situated 
social and political practices, the specification of historically concrete concepts of 
analysis, the historicisation of ontologies, and the study of contextualised 
rationalities and inter-subjectivities. Whereas scientism is directed towards 
theoretical generalisations, historicism is directed towards historical specification.4 
                                                          
2 Alvin Gouldner, The Two Marxisms: Contradictions and Anomalies in the Development of Theory 
(London: Macmillan, 1980), p. 34. 
3 Ibid.,  pp. 41-42. 
4 There are three broad meanings of historicism in circulation. The first refers to Karl Popper’s charge 
that orthodox Marxism (and some other theories of history) conceives of history as subject to a pre-
programmed sequence of stages, following an inherent telos or law-likeness. Popper’s concept of 
historicism was idiosyncratic, as he remained virtually alone in understanding the concept this way. The 
second refers to the 19th Century German Historical School (Historismus), which largely pursued a 
historicist method emphasising the specific and unique character of historical phenomena in their 
individuality, captured by ideography and source criticism. And the third refers to a Marxist historicism 
which grounds the historicity of phenomena not in abstract laws, but in specific historically situated social 
practices. Johnson Kent Wright, “History and Historicism”, in Theodore M. Porter and Dorothy Ross 
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In this sense, the question of IR/HS and, by extension, IHS, should not be 
conceived primarily in terms of how different theories – (Neo-)Realism, 
Weberianism, Marxism, Constructivism, Post-Structuralism, etc. – conceptualise 
the merger between IR and HS. It should be pursued by first establishing whether 
they subscribe to either rationalist, structuralist, and positivistic or to post-
positivistic conceptions of social science and, secondly, how these premises 
translate into more substantive propositions of IHS.5 This article starts therefore 
from the assumption that the IR/HS project needs to be relocated in the wider 
post-positivist IR debate, of which it was originally an organic part. 6  For this 
terrain of epistemology did not only challenge the prevailing rationalism in 
mainstream US IR theory, opening IR up to the full panoply of non-positivistic 
conceptions of social science, it provides also the ultimate ground on which 
different IR/HS theories stand and differ. The idea of the scientistic/historicist 
divide will thus act as a general background theme throughout this text. The 
article argues that while the two main non-Marxist theories in the field of IR/HS 
under investigation – Neo-Realism, Neo-Weberianism – are anchored on the 
scientistic side, the disjuncture between scientism and historicism cuts also 
through Marx’s own thoughts on international relations and is still alive in 
contemporary Marxist approaches to IHS. In fact, the two main Marxist IR 
approaches under investigation – UCD and PM – are anchored on opposite sides 
of this long-standing divide. This has significant implications for their diverging 
conceptions and conduct of IHS. 
The article proceeds in three steps. It starts by setting out what is at 
stake in IHS. Why was the turn from mainstream IR Theory to IHS first put on the 
agenda and what specific promises did it hold? This section includes a critique of 
attempts to periodise the sub-field of IHS in terms of three successive waves, 
each superseding the previous one, and suggests the idea of contending and 
ongoing theoretical centers of gravity. 
                                                                                                                                                     
(eds.), The Cambridge History of Science, vol. 7: The Modern Social Sciences (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008), pp. 113-130. 
5  The meanings of positivism and neo-positivism in the social sciences and IR are multiple, but a 
conventional understanding suggests that “positivism is usually characterised by its research of the 
identification and explanation of universal laws in unity, or in conformity, with the practices of the 
natural sciences, especially physics”. Frederick Guillaume Dufour, “Positivism”, in Bertrand Badie, Dirk 
Berg-Schlosser and Stefano Morlini (eds.), International Encyclopedia of Political Science (Thousand 
Oaks, CA: Sage, 2011), p. 2081. Steve Smith clarifies: “Particularly important was the work of Carl 
Hempel, because he developed an extremely influential account of what is involved in explaining an 
event. He argued that an event is explained by “covering” it under a general law. Usually, this takes the 
form of a deductive argument whereby (1) a general law is postulated, (2) antecedent conditions are 
specified, and (3) the explanation of the observed event deduced from (1) and (2). This model is known 
as the “deductive-nomological” model, and Hempel argued famously that it could be applied to the social 
sciences and history”. Steve Smith, “Positivism and Beyond”, in Steve Smith, Ken Booth, and Marysia 
Zalewski (eds.), International Theory: Positivism and Beyond (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1996), p. 15; Carl G. Hempel, “The Function of General Laws in History”, Journal of Philosophy (Vol. 39, 
No. 2, 1942), p. 39. 
6 Steve Smith, ‘‘Historical Sociology and IR Theory”, in Stephen Hobden and John Hobson, Historical 
Sociology of International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 223-243. 
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After this scene-setting overture, the article reminds us in a second step 
why a Marxist IHS cannot passively rely on the conceptual import of the inter-
state system from Neo-Weberian HS. It proceeds through a critical analysis of a 
prominent Neo-Weberian historical sociologist, Charles Tilly, and shows how the 
relative absence of international relations in the sociological, including Marxist, 
canon led Neo-Weberians not only to reclaim the field of IHS by re-emphasising 
the primacy of geopolitical over social interpretations, but to also accept rationalist 
and structuralist premises, re-aligning Neo-Weberianism with Neo-Realism. It 
further suggests that Neo-Weberians developed an acute awareness of the 
question of method in IHS. It asks how to overcome the internal/external 
(domestic/international) divide in classical HS, interrogating the problem of how to 
move from comparative HS towards IHS. The section concludes by showing why, 
in spite of a sustained effort to overcome this methodological internal/external 
divide, a historicist Marxism remains pertinent in the face of Neo-Weberianism’s 
problematic answers, for it raises the question of the historicity of this very 
differentiation, which, in turn, disables the very formalisation of a general IHS 
methodological framework. 
The final step opens up towards a critical dialogue between two 
prominent contemporary Marxist IR/IHS approaches, respectively UCD and PM.7 It 
seeks to clarify their essential theoretical differences and demonstrates how these 
lead towards very different interpretations of (international) history – one 
informed by a renewed search for stable ontologies, transhistorical categories of 
analysis and causal laws of history, and the other informed by a radical 
historicisation of the field of ontology (what the world is made of during distinct 
periods in time), conceptuality, and social practices. In short, they subscribe to 
radically different versions of meta-theory, reflected in the “Two Marxisms”. The 
section suggests remaining sceptical of UCD’s premises and promises, most 
notably due to its abstract, trans-historical and deductive-nomological cast. It also 
argues that the very idea of a general, unitary and universal IHS theory – 
founding the super-discipline of IHS – does not only run counter to the idea of 
Marxism as a historicist and critical social science, but leads towards acute 
conceptual and ontological anachronisms, premised on the radical de-
historicisation of the fields of ontology, conceptuality and disciplinarity. This 
includes the semantic neutering and hyper-abstract re-articulation of the very 
category, which in IR’s self-perception lends legitimacy to its claim of disciplinary 
distinctiveness: the international. In fact, UCD reneges on the promise of HS for 
IR as it re-aligns with the positivistic conception of theory prevalent in Neo-
Realism. The article concludes by suggesting that an understanding of Marxism as 
a historicist social science subverts all calls for the construction of grand theories 
and, a fortiori, a unitary super-discipline of IHS, premised on a set of universal, 
space-time indifferent, and abstract categories and ontologies that hold across the 
                                                          
7 For a survey of the wider field of Marxist IR see Benno Teschke, “Marxism”, in Christian Reus-Smit and 
Duncan Snidal (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of International Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2008), pp. 163-187. 
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spectrum of world history. In contrast, recovering the historicist credentials of 
Marxism, demands a constant temporalisation and specification of the fields of 
ontology, conceptuality and disciplinarity.8 This includes an understanding of “the 
international” as a historical rather than a theoretical category. This argument will 
be developed by drawing critically on the tradition of (Geo-)Political Marxism. The 
objective is to lay the foundations for a historicist social science of geopolitics. 
What is at Stake in International Historical Sociology? 
What were the essential issues and basic problems that drove IR to 
“historicise” and “socialise” and HS and HM to “internationalise” their objects of 
inquiry, agendas, and approaches? What is at stake in IHS? For critical versions of 
IR Theory, the promise of this rapprochement between IR and HS held the 
prospect of subverting the mainstream IR reliance on a stable, timeless and 
objective disciplinary core – international anarchy – and attendant conceptual 
vocabulary – states, self-help, power politics, security-dilemma, balance-of-power 
- by historicising, socialising and therewith de-naturalising relations between 
polities across time and space.9 This implied the historicisation of the conceptual 
field and geopolitical practices. This was coupled to a rejection of the trans-
historical premise that the state – in IR’s generic parlance: a conflict-unit – can be 
conceived as a coherent analytical category in its own right, endowed with a 
unitary, self-enclosed and fixed rationality, derived from the competitive 
international strategic patterns which force the socialisation of conflict-units into 
an isomorphic logic of geopolitical survival. For in mainstream IR theory, political 
rationality was either logically deduced from a systemic conception of inter-state 
anarchy (Neo-Realism), formalised as a general law of world history, or 
subjectively posited as an innate quality of politicians, encapsulated in the notion 
of animus dominandi (the will to dominate), ultimately grounded in human nature 
(Realism). Opening up the state by “bringing social relations back in” and by 
“historicising geopolitics” encouraged the recovery of the collective and contested 
social agency that shapes variations in forms of political communities, geopolitical 
orders and strategic conduct (rather than behaviour). This suggested a turn to the 
study of historically diverse political subjectivities and relations in time and space, 
which were not subsumable under the universal axiomatics of Rationalist IR. This 
rejection of state-centrism, stable ontologies, and universal political rationalities 
implied ultimately the direct negation of the discipline-constitutive thesis that 
                                                          
8 The notion of critique in Marxism as a critical social science cannot be pursued in this paper. Note, 
however, that it is incompatible with structuralist versions of IR Marxism and has been largely 
disregarded in these approaches. 
9 Faruk Yalvac, “The Sociology of the State and the Sociology of International Relations”, in Michael 
Banks and Martin Shaw (eds.), State and Society in International Relations (New York/London: Harvester 
Wheatsheaf, 1991), pp. 93-113; Hobden and Hobson, 2002, op. cit. in note 6; George Lawson, 
“Historical Sociology in International Relations: Open Society, Research Programme and Vocation”, 
International Politics (Vol. 44, No. 4, 2007), pp. 343-368. 
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international relations occupy a separate, distinct and autonomous sphere of 
reality, justifying IR’s standing as a distinct discipline, sealed off from both History 
and Sociology. 
This break with the prevailing supra-sociological geopolitical structuralism, 
composed of states as unitary-rational actors, implied also a shift from systemic IR 
theories of strategic reproduction to social theories of dynamic historical processes, 
for which HS provided a richer pool of intellectual resources and theoretical 
traditions than mainstream IR. The re-historicisation and re-sociologisation of an 
apparently timeless anarchical human condition and reified set of categories 
facilitated studies into the historical origins and social sources of qualitatively 
dissimilar geopolitical orders, the contested transitions between, and the variable 
foreign policy conduct within distinct multi-polar orders. Rather than conforming 
to the general IR idea that posited an aprioristic and transhistorical extra-
sociological international structuralism as the inescapable horizontal inter-state 
logic that forced all state-alternatives to comply with the competitive pressures of 
international anarchy, IHS recovered the vertical state/society relations to 
transcend the black box of the state by returning to the socio-historically specific 
trajectories of multiple polity-experiences, the construction of diverse geopolitical 
orders, and the variable political rationalities and relations within them. In short, it 
socialised and historicised “anarchy”. The objective was not to displace 
international relations, but to show - with recourse to the standard concerns of HS: 
large-scale and long-term social change within particular polities - how geopolitical 
inter-action was historically construed in variable ways. The original promise of 
the inter-disciplinary dialogue between IR and HS, in the context of the post-
positivist debate in IR, generated a new research agenda and re-admitted a wider 
array of non-positivist theoretical perspectives into the heart of the discipline. 
But IR theory did not go empty-handed to HS. For here the challenge was 
exactly the obverse: As IR moved in the 1980s towards a more historical–
sociological redefinition of the state and the states-system, HS moved in the 
opposite direction: reclaiming international relations and, in particular strategic 
inter-state rivalry, as the missing dimension in society-centered classical sociology, 
including Marxism.10 The promise of inter-disciplinarity cleaved into two related 
concerns. The first interrogated not only how social relations shape political 
communities and external conduct over time, but also how geopolitical contexts 
shape political institutions, political rationalities, and social relations in space. 
State rationality was Janus-faced, facing inside and outside. This duality had to be 
incorporated into a revised methodological framework. The second concern called 
                                                          
10 Aristide Zolberg, “Strategic Interactions and the Formation of Modern States: France and England”, 
International Social Science Journal, (Vol. 32, No. 4, 1980), pp. 687-716; Anthony Jarvis, “Societies, 
States and Geopolitics: Challenges from Historical Sociology”, Review of International Studies (Vol. 15, 
No. 3, 1989), pp. 282-93; Roland Axtmann, “The Formation of the Modern State: The Debate in the 
Social Sciences”, in Mary Fulbrook (eds.), National Histories and European History (London: Westview 
Press, 1993), pp. 21-45. 
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therefore for the development of methodological perspectives that formalised this 
inside/outside problem by overcoming two recurrent methodological fallacies. The 
first referred to the problem of internalism – “the myth of bounded societies” or 
“methodological nationalism” - in which polities were conceived as pre-constituted, 
discrete, and self-referential units of analysis, directing research to the 
longitudinal reconstruction of change within these units.11 While internalism had 
the advantage of demonstrating qualitative temporal developments internal to the 
unit of analysis in question, it remained restricted by the systematic elision of 
wider international contexts – generating a methodological uni-linearity over time 
in abstraction from wider external relations. The second fallacy identified the limits 
of comparative HS, which directed research to the external comparison between 
the trajectories of two or more polities. While this had the advantage of 
demonstrating dissimilarities between the trajectories of plural units of analysis, it 
remained again compromised by the elision of their geopolitical relations – 
generating a methodological multi-linearity over time in abstraction from external 
relations. What was missing in HS, Marxist and non-Marxist alike, was the 
conception of an analytical framework wide enough to incorporate the internal 
and external dimensions of state/society development in time and space – a 
conception of spatio-temporal inter-relationality. Internalism and comparativism 
had to be modified and re-articulated in form of an internationally-expanded HS. 
The mobilisation of the classical IR literature was held to assist this theoretical re-
orientation, for it brought to the table the specific problematique of geopolitical 
contexts, which classical HS, from Marx to Weber, had not properly recognised or 
theorised as a defining feature of world history. 
What crystallised in the course of the last three decades was therefore not 
simply a two-way traffic - the mobilisation of the classical canon of HS for IR and 
vice versa - for ultimately the stakes were raised. To the degree that a 
commitment to general theory building (as opposed to mid-range theories, micro-
studies, or narratives) was sustained, spanning both disciplines, the final prize was 
to generate a new and higher theoretical synthesis, which incorporated the core-
problematique and findings of HS (large-scale and long term socio-historical 
change over time) into the core-problematique and findings of IR (the spatial 
separation of polities in a rulerless geopolitical pluriverse).12 For a while, both 
disciplines – HS since the 1970s and IR since the 1980s – seemed to converge on 
a common research and theory agenda with ample incidences of empirical cross-
fertilisation and theory import and export. In retrospect, this common project 
revolved around the search for an IHS that integrated internalism and externalism 
with a dynamic historical perspective, which overcame the limits of HS’s non-
international sociological comparativism and the limits of IR’s extra-sociological 
                                                          
11 Fred Halliday, “For an International Sociology”, in Hobden and Hobson, op. cit. in note 6, p.247; Daniel 
Chernilo, “Social Theory’s Methodological Nationalism: Myth and Reality”, European Journal of Social 
Theory, (Vol. 9, No. 1, 2006), pp. 5-22; Daniel Chernilo, “Methodological Nationalism and the Domestic 
Analogy: Classical Resources for their Critique”, Cambridge Review of International Affairs (Vol. 23, No. 
1, 2010), pp.87-106. 
12 John M. Hobson, George Lawson and Justin Rosenberg, “Historical Sociology”, in Robert A. Denemark 
(ed.), The International Studies Encyclopaedia (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), pp. 3357-75. 
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geopolitical structuralism - the quest for a unitary framework within a newly 
pronounced super-discipline of IHS. 
This analytical narrative can be retold in terms of the self-periodisation of 
the sub-disciplines’ chronological trajectories. Both disciplines, IR and HS, have 
recently suggested compressed surveys that periodise, chart, and classify the 
evolution of their respective fields in terms of three successive waves to retrace 
the partial convergence, but also latter-day divergence, towards a common 
theoretical paradigm and research agenda.13 
Within IR, the sequence comprises a first wave of primarily Weberian HS 
(alongside English School, Marxist and Constructivist approaches) during the 
1980s, drawing on figures like Charles Tilly, Theda Skocpol, Anthony Giddens, and 
Michael Mann, to explore the interaction between the inter-state system and 
domestic state/society relations.14 This conversation, particularly for critical and 
Marxist scholars, hit a buffer as these contributions returned the project of IHS to 
the quasi-Realist overriding structural imperatives of geopolitical competition, 
which absorbed different polities into the homogenising logic of military rivalry.15 A 
second wave emerging in the 1980/90s drew – again alongside developments in 
Constructivism, the English School, and Post-Structuralism - more directly on 
Marxist and Marxisant modern classics, including Antonio Gramsci, Immanuel 
Wallerstein, Perry Anderson, Robert Brenner and Fernand Braudel. 16  It 
incorporated social relations, class conflicts and the rise and development of 
capitalism into their reformulations of IHS, linking these to processes state-
formations, military rivalry, international hegemonies, and the rise of the modern 
                                                          
13  Ibid.; Julia Adams, Elisabeth S. Clemens, Ann Shola Orloff (eds.), “Introduction: Social Theory, 
Modernity, and the Three Waves of Historical Sociology”, in Adams, Clemens, and Orloff (eds.), 
Remaking Modernity (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2005), pp. 1-72. 
14 Charles Tilly (ed.), The Formation of National States in Western Europe (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1975); Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital and European States, AD 990-1992 (Cambridge, 
MA: Blackwell, 1992); Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, 
Russia and China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979); Anthony Giddens, The Nation-State 
and Violence: Volume Two of a Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism (Cambridge: Polity, 
1985); Michael Mann, The Sources of Social Power, vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1986); Michael Mann, The Sources of Social Power, vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1993); Michael Mann, States, War and Capitalism: Studies in Political Sociology (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1988). 
15 John Hobson, The Wealth of States (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1997); John Hobson, The 
State and International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Hendrik Spruyt,The 
Sovereign State and its Competitors (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994); Stephen Hobden, 
International Relations and Historical Sociology (London: Routledge, 1998). 
16 Antonio Gramsci, Selections from Prison Notebooks (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1971); Immanuel 
Wallerstein, The Modern World System, vol. 1 (New York: Academic Press, 1974); Immanuel Wallerstein, 
The Modern World System, vol. 2 (New York: Academic Press, 1980); Perry Anderson, Passages from 
Antiquity to Feudalism (London: Verso, 1974); Perry Anderson, Lineages of the Absolutist State (London: 
Verso, 1974); T. H. Aston and C.H.E. Philpin (eds.), The Brenner Debate: Agrarian Class Structure and 
Economic Development in Pre-Industrial Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); 
Fernand Braudel, The Perspective of the World: Civilization & Capitalism, vol. 3 (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1992). 
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inter-state system. 17  While this, the survey feels obliged to report, proved 
productive on multiple levels, the second wave was compromised as it “remained 
unwieldy and heterogeneous, making its distinctive contribution to the discipline 
hard to identify”, including a “failure to theorise the international”.18 Overcoming 
these apparent deficiencies from 2000 onwards, the third wave comprises UCD, a 
non-Eurocentric “Global Dialogic” approach, and an “eventful IHS”. These three 
approaches, the survey suggests, partake of the third wave as they subscribe to a 
redefinition of the core intellectual problematique of IR/HS by replacing C. Wright 
Mills’ “sociological imagination” – revolving around the triangulation between 
structure, history and biography – with an “international imagination”, revolving 
around the triangulation between structure, history, and the international.19 
Within the field of HS, another influential survey of the sub-discipline’s 
trajectory suggests a periodisation following a different temporal sequence of 
three waves.
20
 Against the backdrop of classical sociology, which was centrally 
concerned with the transition from tradition to modernity, the first wave (up to ca. 
1965) revolved largely around the paradigm of a Weber-inspired Modernization 
Theory and a Parsonian structural-functionalism, formulating abstract stages of 
development and static taxonomies with little grounding in actual historical 
research. The second wave (ca. 1965-1990) was characterised by a Marx/Weber 
synthesis, which began to break down during the 1990s and was succeeded by an 
ongoing post-Marx/Weber third wave. Substantively, the second wave comprised 
studies on large-scale and long-term processes, including the rise of capitalism, 
industrialisation, class-formation, revolution, war, state-making, secularization, 
rationalization, individuation and formal organisations. Theoretically, it embraced 
versions of comparativism, political economy, structuralism and determinism, 
while conceiving of social change in terms of linear, epochal and progressive 
transitions (teleology). Its conception of agency was largely utilitarian and 
rationalist as political action was often derived from economic or social position. 
The third wave, in contrast, developed as a reaction to the Marx/Weber synthesis 
                                                          
17 Kees van der Pijl, The Making of an Atlantic Ruling Class (London: Verso, 1984); Martin Shaw (ed.), 
War, State and Society (London: Macmillan, 1984); Robert Cox, Production, Power and World Order 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1987); Fred Halliday, Rethinking International Relations (London: 
Macmillan, 1994); Giovanni Arrighi, The Long Twentieth Century: Money, Power and the Origins of Our 
Times (London: Verso, 1994); Justin Rosenberg, The Empire of Civil Society: A Critique of the Realist 
Theory of International Relations (London: Verso, 1994); Benno Teschke, The Myth of 1648: Class, 
Geopolitics and the Making of Modern International Relations (London: Verso, 2003); Hannes Lacher, 
Beyond Globalisation: Capitalism, Territoriality and the International Relations of Modernity (London: 
Routledge, 2006); Adam Morton, Unravelling Gramsci: Hegemony and Passive Revolution in the Global 
Political Economy (London: Pluto Press, 2007). 
18 Hobson, Lawson, Rosenberg, op. cit. in note 12, p.3366. 
19 This erases biography and agency from IHS’s theoretical premises. Hobson, Lawson, Rosenberg, op. 
cit. in note 12, p. 3358. 
20 Adams, Clemens and Orloff, op. cit. in note 13. See also Philip Gorski, “Beyond Marx and Hintze? 
Third-Wave Theories of Early Modern State Formation”, Comparative Studies in Society and History (Vol. 
43, No. 4,  2001), pp. 851-861. 
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and comprises five distinct groupings: (1) institutionalism, (2) rational choice, (3) 
the cultural turn, (4) feminism, and 5) post-colonialism. “Rational choice” apart, it 
took identity, religion, ethnicity, race, culture, nation, gender and informal 
organisations as their central objects of analyses, while theoretically emphasising 
case studies, cultural and discourse analysis, agency, and contingency, conceiving 
of historical development in terms of moments of non-linear transposition and 
recomposition. While the third wave constitutes a heterogeneous group of 
scholars, they are largely united in their aversion to material structuralism, 
political economy, and essentialism. 
While these two surveys – from within IR and HS respectively – suggest 
different disciplinary temporalities, identifying a partial bi-disciplinary convergence 
in the 1980s/90s towards a common Marx/Weber synthesis, they share the 
language of waves as a periodising device. Yet, the language of waves has not 
gone unchallenged. For other surveys in HS deny a temporal logic of supersession 
inherent in the metaphor of waves, neatly dividing a heterogeneous field into a 
“before” and an “after”, and identify several co-existing and ongoing “centers of 
gravity” with no specific chronological beginnings or endings. Patrick Carroll, for 
example, objects to an “agonistic and inter-generational logic of supersession” by 
suggesting parallel and competing “centers of gravity”, loosely organized around 
thematic and theoretical preferences (respectively the “military-fiscal”, 
“autonomous state”, and “cultural” centers of gravity). 21  Dylan Riley, in turn, 
raises a similar charge against the language of waves embraced by third-wavers 
since “periodising the development of historical sociology in terms of waves of 
development (…) would seem to be a quintessentially second wave enterprise. For 
the language of waves inevitably suggests a transition from one stage of 
development to another”. Riley detects more evidence “of a field that grows 
through an operation of productive return to origins”, which is for him a return to 
political economy, including Marx and Weber.22 
Schematic and stylized classifications of waves in IR and HS run the risk of 
typological over-simplification, the misrepresentation of a diverse strands of 
intellectual inquiry with multiple and uneven temporalities, and are open to the 
charge of disciplinary and paradigmatic boundary maintenance. At worst, they 
constitute hegemonic gestures. This article, in contrast, starts from the 
assumption that the rendition of the history of theoretical diversity in IR/HS should 
follow the more productive, pluralist, and open-ended idea of competing centers 
of gravity. It further suggests that second wave theories in HS and IR are both, 
neither supplanted, nor sufficiently understood, explored, and refuted. The article 
agrees therefore with Carroll’s and Riley’s suggestion that the second wave of 
                                                          
21 Patrick Carroll, “Articulating Theories of States and State Formation”, Journal of Historical Sociology 
(Vol. 22, No. 4, 2009), pp. 553-603. 
22 Dylan Riley, “Waves of Historical Sociology”, International Journal of Comparative Sociology (Vol. 47, 
No.5, 2006), pp. 379-386. 
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state-formation theories in HS is neither exhausted nor superseded – particularly 
as culturalist approaches to state formation seem to have withdrawn from 
historicizing and theorizing the multi-linear and inter-active inter-political relations 
of state formation processes which non-orthodox theories in the field of IR keep 
problematizing. But the article also suggests that at least one approach within the 
third wave of IHS – UCD – remains theoretically and epistemologically of a par 
with the structuralist proclivities of the Marx/Weber second wave and, ultimately, 
of a par with the core positivist paradigm of IR – Neo-Realism – which the 
historical-sociological turn in IR was meant to overcome. 
Neo-Weberian IHS: War and the Exteriority of the Inter-State 
System 
How do the tensions between scientism and historicism and internalism 
and externalism play out in Neo-Weberian attempts to formulate a theoretical and 
methodological framework for IHS? Initially, the Neo-Weberian move towards IHS 
was not so much conceived as an anti-Marxist project, but rather in terms of a 
Marxified Weberianism directed against the prevailing dominance of Modernisation 
Theory in US Sociology. For Charles Tilly’s and his colleague’s turn to history 
intended to test the prevailing attempts within the Political Development Literature 
in the fields of Politics and Sociology to formulate universal models and 
generalizations about large-scale political changes. These were conceptualized as 
transitions from traditional political orders to modern rationalized states, best 
encapsulated within Modernization Theory. But the largely a-historical nature of 
contemporary US Sociology forced a much more systematic turn to history and 
yielded the establishment of the new sub-discipline of HS. 
Method: Overcoming Internalism and Standard Path 
Tilly’s most seminal research programme was delineated as an inquiry into 
two long and linked processes: “(1) into large-scale structural change in Western 
countries since about 1500; and (2) into changing forms of conflict and collective 
action in the same countries over the same time span. The large-scale changes 
that receive the most attention (…) are state-making and the development of 
capitalism. The countries in question are most frequently France and England.”23 
This research programme was first announced in the volume on The Formation of 
National States in Western Europe and found its most systematic and, perhaps, 
popularized expression in the monograph Coercion, Capital, and European States, 
which can be described as the highwater mark and culmination of his macro-
sociological and structuralist period. 24  The implicit theoretical assumptions 
governing these substantive writings were secured and rendered explicit by his 
two volumes on method in HS – As Sociology Meets History and Big Structures, 
                                                          
23 Charles Tilly, As Sociology Meets History (New York: Academic Press, 1981), pp. x-xii. 
24 Charles Tilly, “Western State-Making and Theories of Political Transformation”, in Charles Tilly (ed.), 
TheFormation of National States in Western Europe (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1975), 
pp. 601-638; Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital and European States, AD 990-1992 (Cambridge, Ma.: 
Blackwell, 1992). 
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Large Processes, Huge Comparisons. 25  Tilly and his Neo-Weberian colleagues 
repeatedly identified two persisting weaknesses in the Political Development 
Literature: “The treatment of each country as a separate, self-contained, more or 
less autonomous case”, which failed to place “the experience of specific areas 
squarely within the large international process which help create that experience”, 
and the formulation of “schemes involving standard stages, sequences, or paths 
of development.”26Tilly conceived of HS as a historically-grounded social science, 
whose emphasis on spatio-temporal specificity and variation subverted all 
epistemological calls for a social-scientific positivism oriented towards the 
construction and testing of generalizing and universalising social laws. As he 
concluded later, “the search for grand laws in human affairs comparable to the 
laws of Newtonian mechanics has … utterly failed”. 27  This rejection of the 
positivist assumptions of Modernization Theory prompted a re-problematisation of 
the question of method in relation to HS, which Tilly introduced as “encompassing 
comparison”, to overcome the dual strictures of classical sociology: “internal logic” 
and “standard path”. 28  Tilly articulated, even if only in nuce, the question of 
method for IHS. How, then, to overcome the dual strictures of classical sociology: 
“internal logic” and “standard path”? How to transcend “methodological 
nationalism” and “stagism” in the direction of IHS? 
Tilly approached the problem by developing a taxonomy of four strategies 
of comparison: (I) individualizing – finding “specific instances of a given 
phenomenon as a means of grasping the peculiarities of each case”; (ii) 
universalizing – finding “that every instance of a phenomenon follows essentially 
the same rule”; (iii) variation-finding – establishing “a principle of variation in the 
character or intensity of a phenomenon by examining systematic differences 
among instances”; and (iv) encompassing comparison – selecting “locations within 
the structure or process and explain similarities or differences among those 
locations as consequences of their relationship to the whole”.29 Tilly’s choice for 
“encompassing comparisons” stretches the definition of the unit of analysis to the 
explananda-encompassing “whole” – those big structures and large processes 
which provide the wider context within which any particular case had to be 
located. Spatio-temporal variations in case-specific trajectories of social change 
are conceived “as consequences of their relationship to the whole”. The substance 
of this whole – the single-society transcending systemic determinants of change, 
                                                          
25 Tilly, op. cit. in note 23; Charles Tilly, Big Structures, Large Processes, Huge Comparisons (New York: 
Russell Sage Foundation, 1984). 
26  Tilly, op.cit. in note 14, pp. 627 and 604. See also Reinhard Bendix, “Tradition and Modernity 
Reconsidered”, Comparative Studies in Society and History (Vol. 9, No. 3, 1967), pp. 292-346 and Theda 
Skocpol, “Wallerstein’s World-Capitalist System: A Theoretical and Historical Critique”, American Journal 
of Sociology (Vol. 82, No. 5, 1977), p. 1075. 
27 Charles Tilly, Social Movements, 1768-2004 (Boulder: Paradigm, 2004), p.9. 
28 Tilly, op. cit. in note 25, p. 125. 
29  Ibid., pp. 82,125. Tilly never fully articulated his method “encompassing comparison” and later 
abandoned it altogether. For a critique see Philip McMichael, “Incorporating Comparison within a World-
Historical Perspective: An Alternative Comparative Method”, American Sociological Review (No. 55, 
1990), pp. 385-97. 
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which also double over as spatially delineating the scope conditions of the relevant 
unit of analysis – is clearly defined: “For our own time, it is hard to imagine the 
construction of any valid analysis of long-term structural change that does not 
connect particular alterations, direct or indirect, to the two interdependent master 
processes of the era: the creation of a system of national states and the formation 
of a worldwide capitalist system”. 30  The procedure of comparison between 
analytically discrete societies – insulated in space and time from their external 
contexts – is replaced by the assumption of establishing variations in relation to 
wider systemic properties: capitalism and the interstate system. What was the 
substantive result of this methodological shift? 
The Tilly-Thesis: War Made States and States Made War 
Tilly’s thesis is positioned in a stylised matrix of extant models of 
European state-formation that distinguish between internalist and externalist, 
political and economic accounts, generating four macro-paradigms – statist 
(internal-political), mode-of-production (internal-economic), geopolitical (external-
political), and world-system’s (external-economic).31 His wider model synthesizes 
the first three, assigning causal directionality from the geopolitical via the statist 
to the internal-economic, generating an “outside-in” and “top-down” explanation 
of temporal and institutional variations in the trajectories of state-formations. 
Within this general geo-statist framework, rulers responded to the strategic 
imperatives of military competition by adopting differential strategies to supply 
revenues and manpower, depending on regionally differentiated socio-economic 
arrangements, notably the presence or absence of capitalism. Coercion-intensive 
regions, defined by the absence of cities and agricultural predominance (states 
like Brandenburg and Russia), are distinguished from capital-intensive regions, 
defined by cities and commercial pre-dominance, where rulers entered into 
temporary coalitions with capitalists (like the Italian city-states and the Dutch 
republic). Both are, in turn, set apart from capitalised coercion-intensive regions 
(like France and England), where rulers incorporated capitalists into state 
structures (representative assemblies) in order to build up standing armies and 
rationalise bureaucracies, producing “fully-fledged national states” by the 
seventeenth century. Instead of uni-linearity, this generated a tri-linear model of 
European state-formations, which ultimately converged, driven by an ongoing 
process of geopolitical adaptation and selection between the 17th and 19th 
Centuries on the successful and universalising capitalised-coercion model: the 
modern nation-state.32 
By systematically incorporating the role of war and geopolitics into their 
accounts of European state formations, Tilly and his colleagues had not only 
opened up Sociology to HS, but had also partly moved beyond Comparative HS to 
an internationally-extended Neo-Weberian HS. This was captured in his striking 
                                                          
30 Tilly, op. cit. in note 25, p. 147. 
31 Tilly, Coercion, Capital and European States, op. cit. in note 24, pp. 6-16. 31. 
32 Ibid., p. 31. 
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and canonical dictum that “War makes states and states make war”, the key 
conclusion of his edited volume The Formation of National States in Western 
Europe.33 The claim that warfare and state formation were strongly interrelated 
was developed in a number of publications from the 1970s to the early 1990s and 
can be regarded as Tilly’s most influential and enduring legacy. It contributed to a 
paradigm-shift in the field of state formation studies.
34
 The new internationally-
extended HS broke not only with Modernization Theory, but also with other 
dominant Liberal and Marxist state-formation paradigms, as they underplayed and 
elided the constitutive impact of war, war finance, and revenue-procurement on 
the growth of state power. Rather than conceiving of state formation as a by-
product of the gradual extension of political and civic individual rights, supported 
by a liberal discourse of Enlightenment, or as a by-product of revolutionary 
transitions from feudalism to capitalism in which united and secular bourgeois 
classes replaced traditional monarchical orders, it was war and the costs of war 
that drove innovations in the sources of military revenues. This forced the 
rationalization of tax systems and revenue-collecting bureaucracies, leading to the 
centralization and autonomy of state power, and ultimately to the public 
concentration and monopolization of the means of violence – central properties of 
the modern state - across many European regions. 
Models like these united Neo-Weberians in expanding the unit of analysis 
from the national to the international, delinking the rise and development of the 
modern state and the inter-state system from modes-of-production analyses, 
replacing uni-linearity with multi-linearity, complementing internal processes with 
external interaction, relaxing strict notions of lawfulness with historicity and 
specificity, and substituting sequential stages, epochal transitions and teleology 
with complexity, variations and diversity (including state exit), giving rise to an 
“outside-in” and “top-down model”. 
                                                          
33 Tilly, “Western State-Making and Theories of Political Transformation”, op.cit. in note 24, p. 42. 
34 Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Theda Skocpol (eds.), Bringing the State Back In (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1985); John Brewer, The Sinews of Power: War, Money, and the English 
State, 1688-1783 (London and Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989); Brian Downing, The Military Revolution 
and Political Change: Origins of Democracy and Autocracy in Early Modern Europe (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1993); Hendrik Spruyt, The Sovereign State and its Competitors: An Analysis of 
Systems Change (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994); Lawrence Stone (ed.), An Imperial State 
at War: Britain from 1689-1815 (London: Routledge, 1994); Thomas Ertman, Birth of the Leviathan: 
Building States and Regimes in Medieval and Early Modern Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1997); Richard Bonney, The Rise of the Fiscal State in Europe, c. 1200-1815 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1999); Jan Glete, War and the State in Early Modern Europe: Spain, the Dutch Republic 
and Sweden as Fiscal-Military States, 1500-1660 (London: Routledge, 2002); Christopher Storrs (ed.), 
The Fiscal-Military State in Eighteenth-Century Europe: Essays in Honour of P.G.M. Dickson (London: 
Ashgate, 2009). For an early critique see Paul Cammack, “Bringing the State Back In?”, British Journal of 
Political Science ( Vol. 19, No. 2, 1989), pp. 261-290. 
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The Interstate System (From Weber to Waltz) and Capitalism (From Marx 
to Weber) 
How plausible is this model? While Neo-Weberians successfully challenged 
“internalism” and “stagism”, their explanations remained flawed on at least five 
counts. (1) the positing of the inter-state system as a reified variable; (2) a bi-
sected conception of state-autonomy confined to its relation to society; (3) the 
absence of a social theory of war; (4) the mis-conception of capitalism and the 
externalisation of social relations and agency; (5) and the final relapse into a Neo-
Realist logic of international competitive selection, homogenising diverse 
trajectories of state-formation into “like-units”. 
As this model requires both a definition of the nation-state and capitalism, 
and an account of the origins of capitalism in relation to the formation of the 
modern inter-state system, the critique is organised around these definitions. 35 
Throughout his analyses, Tilly adopts a classical Weberian definition of the 
modern state, also equated with the category of the nation-state, comprising its 
control over a contiguous territory, its institutional centralization and autonomy, 
and its monopoly over the means of coercion. 36  How does he explain the 
formation of this state? For Tilly – and many other Neo-Weberians - state-
formation is always already inserted into a wider geopolitical environment, whose 
strategic rivalry explains state-formation. But here, a logical sleight of hand 
occurred, as the inter-state system functions simultaneously as a presupposition 
and as an outcome. Tilly has therefore to posit a prior and more generic condition 
of geopolitical fragmentation to remain true to his outside-in model, but 
suppresses the specific question of the nature and constitution of the pre-state 
medieval world. In short, the formula “war-made-states and states made war” 
remained circular. The logical problem can be recast in terms of how to account 
for the transformation of a pre-interstate order – where polities were spatially de-
territorialised, institutionally de-centralised, politically non-autonomous, and where 
the means of violence were oligopolistically dispersed – into an interstate order, 
predicated on multiple nation-states. For any account of plural state-formations in 
the context of the international system cannot take the latter for granted. Rather 
than placing the story of state-formations within an antecedent and more generic 
notion of geopolitical fragmentation, Tilly is challenged to explain the dual 
processes of geographical unit-differentiation: the territorialisation of state power 
                                                          
35 It should be noted that Tilly’s account in Capital, Coercion and Nation-States was no longer explicitly 
governed by his method of “encompassing comparison”, announced - without being retracted or 
reformulated - a decade earlier. 
36 Tilly, “Western States Making and Theories of Political Transformation”, op. cit. in note 14, pp. 27, 70. 
Tilly’s conception of “nation” is never sociological and substantive, but “strictly a term of scale and 
scope”, meaning essentially “state-wide”. Rogers Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the 
National Question in the New Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 16. For an 
account that takes national practices seriously, see Frederick Guillaume Dufour, “Social Property Regimes 
and the Combined and Uneven Development of Nationalist Practices”, European Journal of International 
Relations, (Vol. 13, No. 4, 2007), pp. 583-604. 
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driving the external/internal distinction, generating, in turn, the state/interstate 
distinction, and the vertical separation within each unit of the political/military 
from the economic/social that generates the public/private distinction. At stake is 
therefore not only an organizational transformation of pre-state polities into states 
within a persisting condition of geopolitical fragmentation, but also a spatial 
transformation of de-centralised medieval polities into territorial exclusive and 
sovereign jurisdictions. Only this generates a new quality of inter-spatial relations, 
which only then appear as distinctly inter-state relations. 
Thus reformulated, Tilly encounters a significant complication as the 
interstate system doubles over, in his account, as the “encompassing” master 
category into which any one trajectory of state-formation is inserted and, 
simultaneously, as that phenomenon which requires explanation as the aggregate 
of plural state-formations. But the interstate system cannot function 
simultaneously as the explanandum and the explanans – as outcome and 
presupposition. The international system appears therefore as a pre-constituted 
and aprioristic thing – a timeless given. The absence of a continent-wide empire is 
noted, yet the presence of geopolitical multiplicity in its specific pre-state and 
territorially heterogeneous feudal relations and its bellicose disposition is not 
explained. Geopolitical rivalry functions as a reified independent variable – a 
timeless structure whose anarchical nature imposes its imperatives on its 
members, aligning Neo-Weberian IHS with Neorealism. The content of geopolitical 
anarchy may change (along with its players), but its structural logic remains 
constant. As an objectified explanans, geopolitical fragmentation lies outside the 
model’s theoretical reach and beyond historical interrogation. In other words, the 
critique of “methodological nationalism” cannot simply embrace a “methodological 
internationalism” avant la lettre - before the phenomenon of an inter-state system 
actually emerges without falling into the trap of conceptual anachronism. In fact, 
the dichotomy between “externalist” and “internalist” accounts of state-formation 
misses the non-distinction between these two dimensions in medieval Europe.
37
 
Tilly’s two “encompassing” master processes of modernity – the development of 
capitalism and the rise of the interstate system - are now strategically reduced to 
one, as geopolitical rivalry was always already present in pre-interstate orders. 
Second, what are the implications of Tilly’s account for the question of 
state-autonomy? Since causal directionality invariably travels from the state-
system to its components, Tilly formulates a “military-adaptive” state theory, 
which confines state autonomy to the domestic level as states are forced to 
                                                          
37  Benno Teschke, “Geopolitical Relations in the European Middle Ages: History and Theory”, 
International Organization (Vol. 52, No. 2, 1998), pp. 325-358. Classically from a non-Marxist 
perspective, Otto Brunner, Land and Lordship: Structures of Governance in Medieval Austria, translated 
from the 4th revised edition by Howard Kaminsky and James van Horn Melton (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1992 [1939]); Marc Bloch, Feudal Society (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1961); 
Heinrich Mitteis, The State in the Middle Ages: A Comparative Constitutional History of Feudal Europe 
(Amsterdam: American Elsevier, 1975 [1940]). More recently, Rees Davies, “The Medieval State: The 
Tyranny of a Concept?”, Journal of Historical Sociology (Vol. 16, No. 2, 2003), pp. 280-300. 
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passively adapt to external pressures – or face exit.38 While this provides leverage 
to impose state-interests on societal interests, it appears, inversely, that states 
dispose of no agency to influence or transform the international system – 
generating a one-sided concept of state autonomy. Both operations leave the 
interstate system intact as a timeless systemic level, immune to alterations and 
without any moorings in the social world. 
Third, why would rulers/states conduct war? Where exactly should we 
locate an explanation for war and geopolitical rivalry in this model? What explains 
the frequency, intensity and duration of late medieval and early modern wars?  
Why do we see the rise of the modern state, also referred to by Neo-Weberians as 
the “permanent war-state” and the “fiscal-military state”? As a rule, the argument 
for early modern Europe’s bellicosity oscillates between an ascribed classically 
Weberian invariant and independent rationality of rulers to accumulate the means 
of coercion to preserve or extend their power (political action to maximise power 
and prestige) and the Neo-Realist theorem of a security-dilemma in an anarchical 
situation (si vis pacem para bellum). In the first case, Tilly resorts to the classical 
realist idea of a subjective animus dominandi of rulers (as power-holders, rulers 
want to expand by definition), reiterating the reification of the pursuit of power – 
the autonomy of politics as the quintessential quest for power. In the second case, 
the interstate system is essentially naturalised as a pre-social “state of nature” in 
which invariant foreign policy behaviour is a function derived from the system’s 
anarchical structure. The claim jumps from the assumption of the mere fact of co-
existing contiguous polities to the analytical conclusion that this explains 
geopolitical rivalry. As a historical sociology of war and state-formation that 
explicitly embraces the “bellicist paradigm”, Tilly’s model lacks a social theory of 
war. 
Fourth, where does this leave capitalism – Tilly’s second master-process of 
modernity? In the passage between his major theoretical writings and Capital, 
Coercion and Nation-States, Tilly’s definition of capitalism underwent a radical 
reformulation from a Marxist relational-productivist to a Weberian methodological-
individualist conception. 39  In his earlier critique of Wallerstein’s circulationist 
concept of capitalism as a world-system revolving around production for sale on 
the world-market in which profits were made in acts of exchange (trade), he 
remarked: 
                                                          
38 Hobson, The State and International Relations, op. cit. in note 15, p. 185. 
39 Weber’s definitions of capitalism are notoriously hard to establish and reconcile, since they slide from 
an understanding of capitalism as a specific rational type of profit-oriented economic action, via a specific 
type of organisation of the enterprise, to a specific social relation between capitalists and free labour, 
plus various definitions of ‘political capitalism’. Generally, however, he suggested to define capitalism on 
the basis of “economic factors” alone. “Where we find that property is an object of trade and is utilized 
by individuals for profit-making enterprise in a market economy, there we have capitalism.” Max Weber, 
The Agrarian Sociology of Ancient Civilizations (London: Verso 1998), p. 51. This definition allows Weber 
to identify capitalism or “capitalist action” as a trans-historical phenomenon. 
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 “In tracing the development of European capitalism I have seized 
the other horn of the Marxist dilemma, emphasizing the immediate relations 
of production as the defining features of capitalism. That choice produces a 
narrower, later catalog of capitalist development. Wallerstein’s broad 
definition, it seems to me, sacrifices the sort of insight concerning the logic of 
capitalist social relations that Marx unfolded in his analysis of agrarian change 
in England – especially the insight into the way in which the capitalist’s 
pursuit of profit helped transform workers into proletarians. For those who, 
like me, want to examine how the development of capitalism affected the 
collective action of ordinary people, that insight is essential, its loss critical.”40 
Here, Tilly defines the capitalism in classical Marxist productivist terms and 
identifies its origins in 17th Century agrarian England, rather than in Wallersteinian 
circulationist terms associated as a pan-European process located in the “long 16th 
century”. This conception is abandoned, without comment, a decade later. “Let us 
think of capital generously, including any tangible mobile resources, and 
enforceable claims on such resources. Capitalists, then, are people who specialize 
in the accumulation, purchase, and sale of capital. They occupy the realm of 
exploitation, where the relations of production and exchange themselves yield 
surpluses, and capitalists capture them. Capitalists have often existed in the 
absence of capitalism, the system in which wage-workers produce goods by 
means of materials owned by capitalists. Through most of history, indeed, 
capitalists have worked chiefly as merchants, entrepreneurs, and financiers, rather 
than as the direct organisers of production.”41 
This move from a Marxist conception of capitalism as a social relation of 
production to a Weberian definition of capitalist action - capitalists as individual, 
extra-relational, and economic profit-maximisers - enables him to desist from 
investigating the historically specific origins of capitalism. This conceptual 
redefinition allows him to detect capitalists across a wide variety of social and 
temporal settings. By dissolving the concept of capitalism into a timeless condition 
(a type of economic action), capitalists preceded capitalism as a social relation of 
production. Through this move towards Weber, Tilly is in a position to conceive of 
the efficacy of the presence of capitalists on processes of state-formation in 
quantitative, rather than in qualitative, terms as capital becomes an ever-present 
resource for rulers, rather than a historically distinct social power. This frees him 
to theorise or acknowledge the transition from feudalism to capitalism as an 
intellectual problem.42 Given the reified conceptualisation of the inter-state system 
and the “passive-adaptive” view of the state, the locus for explaining variations 
travels towards the regionally differentiated domestic configuration of what is 
                                                          
40 Tilly, op.cit. in note 23, pp. 41-42. 
41 Tilly, Coercion, Capital and European States, op.cit. in note 14, p. 17. The ambiguous reference to 
“exploitation” drops out of Tilly’s handling of the definition of capitalism in his substantive sections. 
42 “I will treat the changing organization of production and the resulting class structure only cursorily.” 
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conceptualised as socially disembodied pools of available material resources, 
rather than as social relations. Where Tilly examines social forces, the account 
remains restricted to the analysis of inter-elite relations (relations between ruling 
and dominant classes) – notably, state-capitalist and state-nobility relations.  
Tilly’s passage between 1975 and 1992 from a minimally class-analytic to 
a state-centric position, which renders the agency of the peasantry passive, is 
instructive. For in 1975, he conceded that “the predominance of peasants drew 
state-makers willy-nilly into struggles and coalitions with the men who controlled 
the land. The strongest argument one could make for the peasant base as a cause 
of the state’s victory is that the presence of peasants gave power to major 
landlords, and the necessity of coalitions with regional groups of landlords (who 
had some choice with which authorities to ally themselves) both limited the scale 
at which princes could operate and pushed them towards territorial 
agglomeration.”43 Later, peasants feature only descriptively as mere objects, as 
their “fate” “differed dramatically between coercion-intensive and capital-intensive 
regions.”44 But any political-military sociology of state-formation or fiscal sociology 
of administration needs, by definition, to incorporate those subjects over whom 
power is extended and fiscal extractions are exercised as active agents (as a 
category of social analysis), which co-determined the tax-rate. Failing that the 
peasantry is merely conceptualised as a de-subjectified and neutral tax-base. 
Given the predominantly agrarian social relations of late medieval and early 
modern Europe, the explanation of state-variations requires, therefore, an 
extension of the field of social forces to include, at a minimum, the constitutive 
role of the peasantry in the differential resolution of class conflicts over the 
sources and modalities of extraction, property-relations and the power-
configurations (state-forms) that institutionalised these conflicts. But the later Tilly 
explicitly abandoned the analysis of social relations and class conflict: “In order to 
concentrate on mechanisms of state-formation I will repeatedly stereotype or take 
for granted the relations among landlords, peasants, agricultural proletarians, and 
other major rural actors.” 45  Tilly’s two “encompassing” master processes of 
modernity – the development of capitalism and the rise of the interstate system - 
are now strategically reduced to none, as capitalists were always already present 
in cities. 
But how useful is the language of “variation”? In his quest to overcome 
uni-linear explanations, Tilly failed to embrace the full diversity of multi-linear and 
unique regional experiences of state-formations, restricting his analytical reach to 
a tri-linear schemer in which the “capitalised-coercion intensive” model serves as 
the ultimately successful norm to which all other deviant and sub-efficient cases 
had to adapt - from tri-linearity back to uni-linearity. The production of middle-
range generalisations subsumes case-specific trajectories under one of his three 
rubrics. This is especially problematic for Tilly’s collapsing of English and French 
                                                          
43 Tilly, The Formation of National States in Europe, op. cit. in note 14, p. 28. 
44 Tilly, Coercion, Capital and European States, op.cit. in note 24, p. 152. 
45 Ibid., p. 34. 
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experiences, as they do not represent roughly equivalent trajectories, but radically 
divergent cases. Since Tilly deploys no concept of capitalism (only capitalist 
economic action) and excludes the agency of the peasantry, he disables himself to 
identify the rise of agrarian capitalism as the differentia specifica of England’s 
state-development, generating a capitalist-parliamentarian monarchical state-form, 
and its absence in pre-revolutionary France, generating a non-capitalist 
monarchical absolutism – the persistence of the Old Regime. While the move from 
uni-linearity to tri-linearity usefully introduces complexity, it fails to provide 
guidance on the full multi-linearity of all spatio-temporally specific trajectories of 
state-formation in Europe. This includes the need to account for variations within 
his triple classificatory scheme. Finally, Tilly’s suggestion that the ultimately 
successful “capitalised-coercion” model became generalised by crowding out sub-
optimal polities relies on a quasi-biological conception of neo-evolutionary 
selection, recalling Neo-Realism, which fails to explain the longevity, co-existence 
and survival of other state-forms (even today). In the end, Tilly’s objective to 
overcome “standard path” and “stagism” generated not multi-linearity, but tri-
linearity, which itself relapsed into uni-linearity, as the “successful” modern nation 
state allows apparently for no further variations and specificities. The result is a 
convergence towards Neo-Realism’s inter-state system, composed of 
homogeneous and “like-units”. 
Two Logics of Capital and Coercion and the Reification of Agency 
Tilly’s two “encompassing” and “systemic” master processes of 
modernity–capitalism and the interstate system– are either conceptually dissolved 
or posited as generic and aprioristic presences. This procedure forfeits historical 
specificity, as not only capitalism (in the generic form of urban-based capitalists), 
but also the interstate system (in the generic form of geopolitical fragmentation) 
appear now as pre-constituted phenomena in which only the “players” change. 
The specific question of how to account for both – individually and in their 
interrelation - disappears from view. But none of this is, of course, a problem for 
Neo-Weberians as these moves constitute a faithful return to Weber’s ontological 
pluralism – the conception of the world as having always already been segmented 
into multiple spheres of social action – most dramatically modelled in Michael 
Mann’s IEMP model - each endowed with their own rationalities: interdependent, 
but ontologically separate and pre-constituted. 46  This theoretical architecture 
connects Tilly’s fourfold matrix – geopolitical, statist, economic, world-market - to 
a Weberian sociology of different spheres of social action that carries the claim of 
transhistoricity and multi-causality, as the directionality of causal arrows can, in 
principle, run freely from one pre-constituted sphere of social action to any other. 
More concretely, the account is premised on a dualistic and reificatory conception 
of the analytically and historically discrete logics of capital, associated with cities, 
and coercion, associated with states. “I will resort to metonymy and reification on 
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page after page. Metonymy, in that I will repeatedly speak of “rulers”, “kings”, 
and “sovereigns” as if they represented a state’s entire decision-making 
apparatus, thus reducing to a single point a complex, contingent set of social 
relations. Metonymy, in that cities actually stand for regional networks of 
production and trade in which the large settlements are focal points. Reification, 
in that I will time and again impute a unitary interest, rationale, capacity, and 
action to a state, a ruling class, or the people subject to their joint control.”47 
For Tilly, capitalists engage in rational economic action to the degree that 
their pre-given ends (utility-maximisation and capital-accumulation) are realised 
by means of the peaceful deployment of material resources in acts of market-
exchange, notably in urban markets. States engage in political action to the 
degree that their pre-given ends (power-maximisation to force the submission of 
other groups to the state’s will) are realised by means of the rational organisation 
and deployment of physical coercion, internally and externally. In terms of 
sociological micro-foundations, Tilly reduces Weber’s four types of social action 
(instrumental, value-oriented, emotional and habitual) to but one: instrumental 
rationality. 48  He assigns a transhistorical substantive instrumental rationality to 
rulers/states, generically separated and encased as a type of political action from 
economic action. Equally, he ascribes a transhistorical instrumental rationality to 
capitalists, generically separated and encased as a type of economic action from 
political action.49 States emerge, when the means of coercion accumulate and 
concentrate; cities emerge, when capital accumulates and concentrates.  
Differential state-formation depends on the absence or presence of the contingent 
conjunction of their external interaction. The analytical positing of two separate 
logics of capital and coercion, corresponding to two irreducible and autonomous 
spheres of social action – ideal-typically conceived by Weber, but reified by Tilly - 
secures the wider argument of transhistoricity, multi-causality and contingency. 
Tilly’s substantive explanation is ultimately premised on a fundamental 
research-organising move that relies on the acceptance of two universalised 
social-order-constituting a priori segmentations – the inside/outside and the 
economic/political distinctions. In the process, Tilly transhistoricises the very 
                                                          
47 Tilly, Coercion, Capital and European States,  op.cit. in note 14, p. 34. 
48 Lapointe and Dufour remind us of this impoverishment of the richer classical Weberian conception of 
types of social action in macro-sociological and structural versions of Neo-Weberian Historical Sociology. 
Thierry Lapointe and Frederick Guillaume Dufour, “Assessing the Historical Turn in IR: An Anatomy of 
Second Wave Historical Sociology”, Cambridge Review of International Affairs (Vol. 25, No. 1, 2012), pp. 
97-121. 
49 Steve Smith is therefore correct to classify Neo-Weberian HS as epistemologically “rationalist”: “Both 
historical sociology and rationalist international relations accept one model of how to analyse the social 
world. Both, therefore, are part of the social science enterprise, in the narrow sense used in the US. 
Accordingly, both deem causal analysis as appropriate to the social world. The leading historical 
sociology scholars, for example Hall, Mann, Skocpol, Tilly and Wallerstein, all accept a broadly 
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233. 
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results of plural state-formations while re-deploying and retro-activating them as 
causal categories, each endowed with their own “logic of action”, to explain this 
very same process. This leads to explanatory circularity as the very outcomes of 
this dual differentiation are re-mobilised and anachronistically antedated as 
initially obtaining and temporally constant starting premises. This suggests that 
the inside/outside and political/economic distinctions require their own 
historicisations. 
The Antinomies of Marxist IR: UCD and PM 
At this point, we can turn more directly to the challenge of how IR 
Marxism approaches the problematique of IHS. Both, UCD and PM started from 
the assumption that international relations form a void in the classical body of 
Marxist scholarship – reaching right back to Marx and Engels’s own work. 
Although there are multiple readings of Marx on international relations, it is 
uncontentious to state that they never afforded systematic attention to the 
problem of how to reconcile their temporally uni-linear conception of history with 
the spatial multi-linearity of dissimilar and interacting developmental trajectories 
of co-existing polities. In fact, the Communist Manifesto elided the problem 
wholesale by positing a transnationalising world-market as the mega-subject of 
capitalist modernity which would flatten all geopolitical heterogeneity – the re-
shaping of the world in capitalism’s own image! Marx’s work is replete with 
suggestive references to the problematique of international relations and foreign 
policy, including – especially towards the later part of his work – open declarations 
of their under-theorised nature. But this belated recognition of the significance of 
the sphere of international relations for the course of history, as even sympathetic 
commentators have repeatedly noted, did never advance beyond fragmentary and 
miscellaneous insights.50 It failed to engender a more systematic reflection on the 
implications of the geopolitical dimensions of social processes over time for the 
classical Marxist stadial conception of history – a reflection that would have to be 
reconciled with and attuned to the basic premises of HM. Some commentators 
have concluded that this lacuna may require a substantial recasting and 
reformulation of the entire architecture of Marx’s theory of history, while most 
have suggested that the magnitude of the challenge of an internationally-
expanded HM may constitute an insuperable obstacle, which pushes the whole 
                                                          
50 Robert N. Berki, “On Marxian Thought and the Problem of International Relations”, World Politics (Vol. 
24, No. 1, 1971), pp. 80-105; Hartmut Soell, “Weltmarkt – Revolution – Staatenwelt: Zum Problem einer 
Theorie der Internationalen Beziehungen bei Marx und Engels”, Archiv für Sozialgeschichte (Vol. 12, No. 
12, 1972), pp. 109-184; Walter B. Gallie, Philosophers of Peace and War: Kant, Clausewitz, Marx, Engels 
and Tolstoy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978); Panajotis Kondylis, Theorie des Krieges: 
Clausewitz – Marx – Engels – Lenin (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1988); Fred Halliday, 1994, op. cit., pp. 47-
73; David Harvey, Spaces of Capital: Towards a Critical Geography (New York: Routledge, 2001), pp. 
312-344. More positively: Terry R. Kandal, “Marx and Engels on International Relations, Revolution and 
Counterrevolution”, in Michael T. Martin and Terry R. Kandal (eds.), Studies of Development and Change 
in the Modern World (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989). pp. 25-76; most recently Kevin 
Anderson, Marx at the Margins: On Nationalism, Ethnicity and Non-Western Societies (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2010). 
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exercise beyond recovery for the tradition. 51  UCD and PM also agreed that 
capitalism was generally misconceptualised by Neo-Weberians and that the inter-
state system was misconceived as a de-sociologised and de-historicised 
“independent variable” and autonomous level of determination whose military 
pressures, similar to Neo-Realism, were held to socialise diverse polities into its 
geo-strategic logic of survival. But while UCD and PM agreed on these lacunae, 
they subsequently developed radically diverging research strategies, conceptions 
of the internal/external divide, historical interpretations of the relation between 
capitalism and the inter-state system, and proposals for how to “merge” sociology 
and geopolitics – encapsulated in diverging conceptions of Marxism as a social 
science, respectively the scientific and the historicist  - the “Two Marxisms”. 
UCD: The Intellectual Context and the Basic Argument 
How, then, to overcome the overwhelming of space by time in classical 
Marxism and classical HS and to repair the disjuncture between sociological 
(internalist) and geopolitical (externalist) forms of explanation in a single schema? 
Justin Rosenberg engaged two sets of interlocutors, one derived from classic 
social theory and another derived from the IR community: Kenneth Waltz. 52 
Registering his dissatisfaction with versions of classic social theory, including 
works in HS/IR, which either remained trapped in a “methodological nationalism” 
(the conception of historical development in the ontological singular), or versions 
that remained trapped in a “methodological universalism” (the conception of 
capitalist development in the “ontological universal”), the charge was that they 
had no conception of IHS. The engagement with Waltz, in turn, was meant to 
secure his novel conception of IHS against the neorealist paradigm.
53
 For Waltz’s 
intellectual puzzle, namely how to theoretically account for the analytical 
separation between “system-level” (the international) and “unit-level” (the 
domestic) without reducing one to the other and, in a second step, how to 
incorporate both levels into a general IR theory, had remained unanswered. The 
objection was that Realists and Neo-Realists had reasoned from the fact of the 
separation between the international and the domestic without having provided a 
prior sociological explanation of their differentiation, and had subsequently 
privileged and insulated the international as that autonomous domain which 
recurrently socialised dissimilar polities into its isomorphic logic of survival. To 
rectify this defect, namely to inscribe the existence of the international into the 
very premises of social theory (rather than to posit a generic analytical separation 
between “system-level” and “unit-level” or to empirically introduce the 
international level descriptively ex post factum as all extant approaches in HS and 
IR were alleged to be liable to), Rosenberg introduced Leon Trotsky’s idea of UCD. 
                                                          
51 Skocpol, op.cit. in note 14; Giddens, op.cit. in note 14; Mann, op.cit. in note 14; Andrew Linklater, 
Beyond Realism and Marxism: Critical Theory and International Relations (London: Macmillan, 1990). 
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This addressed the same question that the Neo-Weberians had already raised: 
How to overcome methodological nationalism, but this time without conceding any 
ground to (Neo-)Realism. How to think of “the international” in strictly sociological 
terms? 
Rosenberg proceeded without returning to his earlier structuralist 
argument developed in his Empire of Civil Society, which derived the existence 
and anarchy of the modern inter-state system (and the balance of power as its 
de-personalised regulatory mechanism) from the anarchy of the logic of the 
capitalist market (and its “invisible hand” as its impersonal regulatory 
mechanism).54 For what had emerged in this text was a conception of history in 
terms of a systemic and diachronic en bloc sequence of successive geopolitical 
orders, theoretically grounded in a systemic and diachronic en bloc succession of 
different modes-of-production. This procedure synchronised the spatio-temporally 
differential, inter-acting, and plural European trajectories of regional socio-
economic and political developments into the abstract and spaceless category of 
the mode-of-production. Four recurring criticisms emerged: (a) socio-political 
transformations and transitions where conceived as system-wide “structural 
discontinuities” devoid of social (class struggle, revolutions, state-formations) and 
geopolitical (war, foreign policy, diplomacy) agential conflicts; (b) the explanatory 
power of capitalism was overstretched as the modern state and the modern inter-
state system were analytically and causally derived from the concept of capitalism 
as structurally and temporally co-eval and co-genetic attributes of modernity; (c) 
the structural differentiation between a capitalist empire of civil society, regulated 
by the impersonal anarchy of the market, and the modern inter-state system, 
regulated by the impersonal anarchy of the balance of power, remained 
mechanistic and created an absolute opposition between the logic of a 
transnationalising market and the territorial logic of power politics, as both 
spheres drifted analytically apart into two co-existing autonomous realms; (d) the 
space-time indifferent perspective could not account for the spatio-temporally 
diachronic, dynamic and inter-relational co-development of multiple and 
differential trajectories of regional developments, increasingly encased in states. 
The idea that all European polities marched simultaneously - in unison and in 
lockstep - through the passages from one mode-of-production to the next 
suggested a broad-brush periodisiation that de-internationalised and re-
synchronised the regionally varying developmental tempi into an orthodox Marxist 
stagism that was hardly reconcilable with the historical record. 
The outcome of the Empire of Civil Society was not so much a Marxist 
critique of the Realist theory of international relations, but rather an explanation, 
now grounded in capitalism, for the de-personalised Realist logic of international 
relations (anarchy, power politics, security dilemma, balance-of-power) to hold, if 
now restricted in its applicability to capitalist modernity: a Marxist explanation of 
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Realism.55 For the economistic and structuralist perspective generated an account 
of (capitalist) international relations, which withdrew passively into the 
stratosphere of the “rules of the game” of Realist high politics, without impacting 
back onto the empire of civil society (and vice versa) – a bifurcation into two 
abstract levels which henceforth travelled side-by-side without disturbing each 
other.56 
How was this conception subsequently altered and revised? Developing 
the notion of UCD as “the sociological formula of the international as a general 
abstraction” for world history as a whole, the basic argument proceeds in four 
basic axiomatic steps: 57  (i) sociological origins of the international (uneven 
development); (ii) definition of the international (societal multiplicity); (iii) causal 
dynamic of the international, registered in the categories of “advance” and 
“backwardness” (expressed in the “whip of external necessity” and “the privilege 
of backwardness”); and (iv) causal effects of the international (combined 
development in backward societies). The opening contention is that the 
international is the result of the unevenness of social development as a whole. 
The multiplicity of societies manifests and is therefore explained by differential 
developmental dynamics, which cause humanity to fragment (over 5000 years ago 
in the transition from hunter-gatherer bands to sedentary agriculture) into 
multiple societies, constituting the international.
58
 It follows, secondly, that the 
international, also interchangeably rendered as the “inter-societal”, is defined as 
“that dimension of social reality which arises from the co-existence within it of 
more than one society”.59 This numerical definition of the international lodged 
UCD’s conception of IHS firmly in the “ontological international”. Third, the 
international is pervaded by a deep causal dynamic as the inter-active 
consequences of multiple societies are re-grounded in the uneven social 
development between them, captured in the metaphors of the “whip of external 
necessity” and “the privilege of backwardness”. Fourth, as more developed 
societies interact with less developed ones, the causal effects of uneven inter-
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societal development express themselves in combined developments in backward 
societies, which reinforce, rather than straighten out, the unevenness of world-
historical development as a whole. 
The suggestion is that UCD, reconceived as a theory of IHS, can 
overcome the strictures of classical sociology, characterized by dynamic 
theorizations of internal change over time, and the deficiencies of comparative HS, 
characterized by theorizations of external differences across space, and the 
strictures of Neo-Realism, characterised by the detachment of an autonomous and 
horizontal field of international relations from the vertical field of social relations. 
This results from the theoretical formalization of the multi-linear and interactive 
dimensions of uneven social development across an inherently internationally 
fragmented social sphere as a historical phenomenon. Whereas Leon Trotsky 
referred to unevenness as “the most general law of the historic process”, UCD was 
now raised to the status of a “universal law”, capable of providing a general and 
unified sociological IR theory. 60  At stake is therefore nothing less than a 
reconstruction and sublation of HM and IR into the higher synthesis of IHS. 
The theoretical switch to UCD was thus performed without re-engaging 
the question of the relation between the historically and regionally specific origins 
and dynamics of capitalism, the formation and permutations of the modern inter-
state system, and their ongoing historical co-development (though not co-genesis) 
in a processual perspective that was theoretically and historically attentive to the 
uneven and relational trajectories of various European regions. Rather, the 
suggestion was that none of the extant approaches in HS/IR – Neo-Weberian, 
Neo-Marxist, Foucauldian or otherwise – had anything significant to say about a 
social conception of “the international”, declaring an intellectual tabula rasa 
encapsulated in the question “Why is there no International Historical Sociology?” 
The move towards UCD, first announced in the Deutscher Lecture and still 
restricted in its temporal and geographical applicability to capitalist history, and 
later abruptly extended to encompass capitalist and pre-capitalist world history in 
toto, had therefore a triple consequence:61 (a) the dissolution the specific question 
of the rise of the modern inter-state system into a more generic and 
transhistorical conception of “the international”; (b) the dissipation of the question 
of the spatio-temporally distinct origins of capitalism in the context of dissimilarly 
developing regional trajectories into a more generic and transhistorical conception 
of uneven development; and (c) the dispersal of the question of the geopolitically 
and socially mediated expansion of capitalism into a more generic and 
transhistorical conception of inter-activity driven by uneven and combined 
development. The criticism of the lack of an active conceptualisation of agency 
remained un-answered. The strategic aim was to develop an ever more expansive, 
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encompassing and, ultimately, abstract set of universal categories, as the 
historical concept of the inter-state system was subsumed under the broader 
category of the international (spatiality), capitalism under development 
(temporality), and international relations under unevenness/combination (inter-
action). The stretching of substantive social categories into space-time indifferent 
and invariant general abstractions was designed to formulate a meta-idiom for 
world-history as a whole. The dilution of the field of conceptuality at the highest 
level of abstraction held the prospect of providing a singular explanatory formula 
for recorded history – and possibly beyond. The adoption of UCD indicated 
therefore at the theoretical level though, as will be argued, not at the 
epistemological level, a break with earlier modes-of-production analysis. What are 
the intellectual liabilities of this project?62 
This original reformulation re-energised the debate on IR and IHS in 
productive ways, but remains problematic and, ultimately, misleading on a least 
five counts:63 (1) the elevation of UCD to a causal and transhistorical IR theory 
articulated as a universal law – a deductive-nomological covering law - modelled 
on the criteria of theory-production specified by Kenneth Waltz’s positivistic 
conception of social theory; (2) an inability to meet the Waltzian law/theory 
distinction, resulting in the conflation of UCD as a law (identifying recurring 
patterns) and as an explanation (theory), rendering the argument circular and 
neutralising its capacity to explain social change; (3) the positing of “development” 
as the subject of history and a corresponding under-theorization of agency – in 
fact: the theoretically explicit externalisation of agency from the project, resulting 
in a failure to theoretically incorporate the human sources of change and 
development into UCD’s premises;64 (4) an inability to bridge the gap between 
theory and history, which manifests itself in an absolute opposition and dualism 
between a general and abstract explanatory theory – a universal passe-partout - 
and the specificities that surface in empirical narratives, which have to be either 
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No. 1, 2009), pp. 29–46, or subliminally for the pre-capitalist period, becoming fully activated during the 
capitalist period (Jamie Allinson and Alex Anievas, “The Uses and Misuses of Uneven and Combined 
Development: An Anatomy of a Concept”, Cambridge Review of International Affairs (Vol. 22, No. 1, 
2009), pp. 47–67). More critically, Ray Kiely, “Spatial Hierarchy and/or Contemporary Geopolitics: What 
Can and Can’t Uneven and Combined Development Explain?”, Cambridge Review of International Affairs 
(Vol. 25, No. 2, 2012), pp.231-48. 
64 Other readings of Trotsky’s notion of UCD retrieve the centrality of social relations and class conflict 
from its original conception. Benjamin Selwyn, “Trotsky, Gerschenkron and the Political Economy of Late 
Capitalist Development’, Economy & Society (Vol. 40, No. 3, 2011), pp. 421-450. Still, acknowledging the 
efficacy of agency as the ultimate arbiter over the form and direction of social change does not seem to 
translate into challenging the theoretical status of UCD as a law. 
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subsumed under the general law, ignored, or declared extra-theoretical, rendering 
the approach empirically opportunistic, confirmationist and self-validating; and (5) 
the ontological, rather than provisional or heuristic character of extrapolated 
concepts as “general abstractions”, a hollowing out of their explanatory power, 
and a corresponding reification and ontologisation – rather than a historicisation - 
of the categories of the international, society, and development. The inflation of 
substantive social categories into space-time indifferent and invariant general 
abstractions deflated their historically specific meanings. 
A Positivistic Conception of Social Theory 
UCD’s self-definition as a universal law and its status as a general social 
theory of international relations are constructed and validated by conforming to 
Waltz’s three criteria of theory-production: 65  (i) the delimitation of a specific 
“object domain” or class of phenomena, here specified as the international; (ii) 
the identification of structured (and hence theorisable) inter-societal patterns of 
law-like behaviour and outcomes operating across this domain; 66 (iii) the non-
inductive creative act, normally called a conjecture or hypothesis, of formulating a 
theory (a “brilliant intuition”), designed to explain the operation of these law-like 
regularities and how they determine actions and outcomes. 
The reconstruction of HM in terms of UCD as IHS proceeds therefore on 
the meta-theoretical terrain defined by Waltz’s conception of social theory, 
informed by Positivism.67 This specific conception of social theory, modelled on the 
classical example of the nomological natural sciences, appears as fundamentally 
secured, settled and non-controversial, or as prima facie consonant with Marx’s or 
Marxism’s idea of the conduct of social science. But this closure of the question of 
epistemology – how shall we construct theories in the social sciences? – in favour 
of positivism stands in sharp contrast to the three-decades old post-positivist IR 
debate, which reacted precisely against the shrinking of the meta-theoretical 
horizon to the rationalist-positivistic paradigm, subjecting it to a series of powerful 
                                                          
65 Rosenberg, op.cit. in note 52, pp. 185-86.  
66 All international patterns? What these patterns contain substantively as vectors of transmission – 
geopolitics, war, trade, finance, ideas, technology, migration, culture, religion – remains unspecified and 
awaits unpacking for the operationalisation of UCD. This looseness proved attractive for non-Marxist 
scholars, as everything seemed to be covered by the general formula of interactivity, but slides either 
towards an eclectic (Weberian?) pluralism or towards an economistic reductionism, if development is 
meant to be an economic category (division of labour, forces of production, or growth) from which all 
other international vectors of transmission can be “read off”. Which spheres of inter-active determination 
are singled out by UCD to avoid a relapse into ad hoc arguments or causal pluralism? 
67 “I adopt the second meaning of the term: Theories explain laws. This meaning does not accord with 
usage in much of traditional political theory, which is concerned more with philosophic interpretation 
than with theoretical explanation. It does correspond to the definition of the term in the natural sciences 
and in some of the social sciences, especially economics”. Waltz further specifies that a theory must be 
constructed through simplification, including the isolation, abstraction, aggregation and idealisation of 
facts. Kenneth Waltz, “Laws and Theories”, in Robert O Keohane (ed.), Neorealism and its Critics (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1986) pp. 33-38. 
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criticisms. 68  The IR debate, in turn, drew on deeper and longer-standing 
controversies within HS, Marxism and the wider philosophy of the social 
sciences.69 This included the standard charges against positivism of structuralism, 
determinism, and objectification. The recurring refrain, alive since the famous 
Methodenstreit (controversy on method) in Germany, as to why theory-production 
in the social sciences and history cannot be modelled on the natural sciences (the 
“unity of science” thesis) can be summed up in one phrase: the social world is a 
human and historical artifice pervaded with consciousness requiring non-
positivistic modes of cognition. 70  While these debates and charges are not 
engaged, discussed or resolved in Rosenberg’s work, they form the very core of 
the long-standing dispute between sociology and history – indeed: form the very 
epistemological controversy in HS – in terms of the tensions between “nomothetic” 
and “ideographic”, “deductive” and “inductive”, “generalising” and “particularising”, 
“explanatory” and “interpretive” human sciences. 71  Are History and Historical 
Sociology part of the sciences or do they form part of the Arts and Humanities? 
Drastically simplified, this can be rendered in form of the question whether history 
is amenable to objectifying sociological covering laws or whether HS should 
proceed on non-positivist and historicist premises, including dialectics, 
phenomenology, hermeneutics, post-structuralism, pragmatics or other 
                                                          
68 Richard Ashley, “The Poverty of Neorealism”, in Robert O Keohane (ed.), Neorealism and its Critics 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), pp. 255-300; Rob B.J. Walker, “History and Structure in 
the Theory of International Relations”, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, (Vol. 18, No. 2, 
1989), pp. 163-183; Martin Hollis and Steve Smith, Explaining and Understanding International Relations 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990); Smith 1996, op. cit.; Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, The Conduct of Inquiry 
in International Relations: Philosophy of Science and its Implications for the Study of World Politics 
(London: Routledge, 2011). 
69 Theodor W. Adorno et al., The Positivism Dispute in German Sociology (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 
1976); Richard Bernstein, The Restructuring of Social and Political Theory (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1976); Perry Anderson, Arguments within English Marxism (London: New Left Books, 
1980); Edward P. Thompson, The Poverty of Theory and Other Essays (New York: Monthly Review 
Press, 1978); Philip Abrams, Historical Sociology (Near Shepton Mallet: Open Books, 1982); Theda 
Skocpol, Vision and Method in Historical Sociology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979); 
Alfred Schmidt, History and Structure: An Essay on Hegelian-Marxist and Structuralist Theories of History 
(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1983); Jürgen Habermas, On the Logic of the Social Sciences 
(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1988); George Steinmetz (ed.), The Politics of Method in the Human 
Sciences: Positivism and its Methodological Others (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2005). 
70 The Methodenstreit (Controversy on Method) started in the late 19th Century as a debate between the 
German Historical School of National Economy and the Austrian Theoretical School. It opposed the 
defenders of Historismus and its emphasis on the historically unique, specific and concrete against the 
defenders of the general, law-like and abstract, which came to be influenced by Positivism - a 
controversy between the “ideographic” and “nomothetic” currents in the social sciences. The 
Methodenstreit continued into the Weimar Republic and constituted economics as a ‘pure science’ and 
affected the discipline of sociology particularly through Max Weber. Simon Clarke, Marx, Marginalism and 
Modern Sociology: From Adam Smith to Max Weber (London: Macmillan, 1982); Dimitris Milonakis and 
Ben Fine, From Political Economy to Economics: Method, the Social and the Historical in the Evolution of 
Economic Theory (London: Routledge, 2007); Volker Kruse, ‘Von der Historischen Nationalökonomie zur 
Historischen Soziologie: Ein Paradigmenwechsel in den Deutschen Sozialwissenschaften um 1900’, 
Zeitschrift für Soziologie (Vol. 19, No.3, 1990), pp. 149-165. 
71 More recently see Craig Calhoun, “Explanation in Historical Sociology: Narrative, General Theory, and 
Historically Specific Theory”, American Journal of Sociology (Vol. 104, No.3, 1998), pp. 846-871; William 
Sewell, Logics of History: Social Theory and Social Transformation (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 
2005). 
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epistemological traditions. In some cases, the gap between theory and history 
was deemed to be so unbridgeable that a retreat into more narrative modes and 
thick descriptions (even a return to classic historiography as “poetic” story-telling), 
which emphasise the subjective, unique and specific, was advocated. This centers 
the wider question of the relation between theory and history, which continues to 
plague the contemporary IR and non-IR Marxist discourse. For here as there, the 
perceived need towards scientific formalisation re-creates the opposition between 
the objectification of social (including diplomatic) praxes subject to higher laws 
and logics and the turn towards history for concrete analyses. The puzzle as to 
how to square the explanatory emphasis accorded to impersonal developmental 
tendencies, logics, or laws of motion with the conscious activity of historical actors, 
their subjectivities and inter-subjectivities, for purposes of IR inquiry remains an 
enduring one. But sine this social-scientific ur-problem is not grasped as de-
stabilising the fundamental self-understanding of UCD (in IR), it keeps oscillating 
between these two poles, while ultimately coming firmly down on the “nomothetic” 
side. 
Listing these controversies is not meant to overwhelm the reader 
pointlessly, but to suggest that the central puzzle is not to recognise that world 
history is multi-linear, uneven, and interactive, but to probe the question on what 
meta-theoretical basis we can start to theorise or interpret dynamic relations 
between polities, which themselves undergo change, over time. The refusal to penetrate the 
question of IHS epistemologically, rather than just sociologically, comes at a 
significant cost. For by implying that meta-theoretical questions are either 
irrelevant or fundamentally settled, by abstaining from addressing these 
epistemological divides – constitutive of the very project of IR, HS, and Marxism – 
and by adopting Waltz’s criteria for theory-production as an apparently self-
evident social-scientific standard of validation and respectability, an 
epistemological void opens up which aligns UCD in IR, no longer by default but 
now by design, with positivism.72 
But even on its own Waltzian terms, UCD remains ambiguous, equivocal 
and, ultimately, tautological. At times, the enormity of UCD’s status as universal 
causal theory seems to invite doubts and prevarications over the question whether 
                                                          
72 Steve Smith, “Rearranging the Deckchairs on the Ship Called Modernity: Rosenberg, Epistemology and 
Emancipation”, Millennium: Journal of International Studies (Vol. 23, No. 2, 1994), pp. 395-415. The 
recent attempt to provide such philosophical premises – an ex post factum re-attachment of dialectics to 
a nomothetic conception of social theory, now embraced following Trotsky, but reprimanded in extant IR 
dialectic thought for not having an ontological notion of the international  - relapses into the addition of a 
sociological (but not philosophical) extra premise: multiplicity. Paradoxically, while stating that dialectical 
thinking requires a move  towards concrete concept-formation in order to come to terms with the  triple 
non-identity between a phenomenon and its concept (with itself over time, with other phenomena in a 
class of similar phenomena, and with its  conceptual abstraction),  Rosenberg fails to draw the 
conclusion of this  correct observation for UCD's own general abstractions (the international, society, 
development), all of which retain a static and universal meaning.  Justin Rosenberg, “The ‘Philosophical 
Premises’ of Uneven and Combined Development”, Review of International Studies  (Vol. 3, No. 39, 
2013), pp. 569-597. 
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it adheres to a descriptive or a causal register, embracing over time a decidedly 
causal idiom littered with categories like “explanation”, “mechanism”, “knock-on 
effects”. This uncertainty resides in the indistinguishability between the structured 
and law-like patterns operating between “societies” and the theory meant to 
explain them. Criteria (ii) of Waltz’s stipulations for theory production, the 
identification of observable empirical generalisations (laws), and (iii) the non-
inductive formulation of a theory capable of explaining these laws, are collapsed 
into each other. The illogical and circular result is that UCD explains UCD. The 
uneven and combined developmental patterns of inter-societal relations double 
over as their own explanation, rendering description and causation identical and 
synonymous.
73
 UCD is therefore simultaneously, but unwittingly, presented as a 
law (a collection of observable empirical regularities) and a theory (a statement 
that explains them). This renders the construction tautological, since it remains 
unclear what drives uneven and combined development. Which theory, in Waltz’s 
sense, explains UCD?74 
But if the law is descriptive, as suggested in some earlier and more 
cautious formulations, it follows that we have to look elsewhere to identify its 
explanatory core, which must now exist outside its nomological reach.75 If the law 
is causal, as more confident passages assert, then international history is 
necessarily governed automatically ex machina by the overriding explanatory 
power of one universal law.76 The unresolved question as to whether causality is 
fully internal to the core premises of UCD generates modifications and protective 
clauses: “The causal weight of this “law” – that societies do not develop in 
isolation – is variable; one cannot specify in the abstract the relative scale or 
qualitative form of its influence”.77 Notwithstanding this qualification, the central 
argument that UCD contains as a general theory of IR all the explanatory 
elements necessary to explain the course of history is never revoked. In fact, the 
sequence of publications, since the idea was first launched, mounts ever-rising 
claims to its universal validity. Yet, to bridge this gap between the general 
abstraction and the historically concrete, UCD needs to bring in “auxiliary and 
intermediate concepts” for its operationalisation, some covered and others not by 
the law of UCD, to enable a firmer grasp when investigating historically more 
specific social relations, modes of power, political spatiality, and diplomacy.78 At 
times, there are open admissions of UCD’s explanatory breakdown, as “not every 
late-developing society is able to take advantage of this privilege of historic 
backwardness’’. 79  If not, why not? Presumably for reasons external to the 
theoretical reach of UCD. And this would demand a relaxation, re-formulation or 
abandonment of its standing as a universal law. For the point of a social-scientific 
                                                          
73 Ray Kiely, Rethinking Imperialism (London: Palgrave Macmillan) p. 269. 
74 “Rather than being mere collections of laws, theories are statements that explain them.” Waltz, op. cit. 
in note 67, p. 32. 
75 Rosenberg, “Why is there no International Historical Sociology”, op.cit. in note 52, p. 319. 
76 Ibid., p. 320; Rosenberg, “Kenneth Waltz and Leon Trotsky”,  op.cit. in note 52. 
77 Rosenberg, “Why is there no International Historical Sociology”, op.cit. in note 52, p. 319. 
78 Matin, op.cit. in note 60, p. 17. 
79 Rosenberg, op.cit. in note 72, p. 585. 
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law is that it holds. Ultimately, the explanatory bottom drops out of UCD as a 
theory of IHS. For the purpose of formulating a general law at the highest level of 
abstraction remains unclear if both the substantive practices that drive its 
operation – that explain uneven and combined development – and the substantive 
practices that nullify its impact are conveniently by-passed and cannot be 
specified in the abstract, in fact: lie outside the theory’s ambit. How causal and 
how universal is the law? 
If this line of reasoning holds, i.e. that theory (explanation) and 
observable patterns (law-like generalities) are collapsed into each other, it also 
becomes apparent that UCD contains no theoretical categories to account for 
change. For the notions of “advance” and “backwardness”, coupled to the notions 
of the “whip of external necessity” and “the privilege of backwardness”, are 
temporal metaphors for unevenness, which stand themselves in need of 
explanation. Likewise, the category of development is only a result of social 
change (a manifestation of social change) and never the cause of change in itself. 
This suggests that the subject of change has to be re-anchored in a category 
outside UCD: “human practice”.80 And since the theoretical premises of UCD – 
development, unevenness, combination - are explicitly evacuated of social agency 
and socio-historical content, it cannot, despite its stated objective of explaining 
interactive change over time, account for change, unevenness, and differences. As 
UCD cannot explain UCD and as it fails to respect Waltz’s law/theory distinction, it 
is fundamentally barred from explaining not only social change, but development 
itself – not to mention non-development and de-development. What these 
reflections reveal is that the formula constitutes maximally a general and 
descriptive summing up of results (where they hold). What is missing is a 
theoretical premise that accounts for UCD, for it forms itself the explanandum 
which requires an explanans. UCD relapses therefore into the same kind of 
circularity that globalisation theorists where rightly charged with falling prey to. 
“In the logical structure of their argumentation, what presents itself initially as the 
explanandum – globalisation as the developing outcome of some historical process 
– is progressively transformed into the explanans: it is globalisation which now 
explains the changing character of the modern world.”81 If we replace the term 
globalisation with UCD, the same logical trap opens up. In the end, UCD takes for 
granted what demands explanation and begs the question of the subject of social 
                                                          
80 “All social life is essentially practical. All mysteries which lead theory to mysticism find their rational 
solution in human practice and in the comprehension of this practice.” “This manner of approach is not 
devoid of premises. It starts out from the real premises and does not abandon them for a moment. Its 
premises are men, not in any fantastic isolation and fixity, but in their actual, empirically perceptible 
process of development under definite conditions”. Karl Marx, cited in Derek Sayer (ed.), Readings from 
Karl Marx (London: Routledge, 1989), pp. 5-6 and 9. For an early mobilisation Marx’s notion of praxis for 
the analysis of international relations and of dialectics as an epistemological mode of apprehension of 
reality and procedure of concept-formation, see Christian Heine and Benno Teschke, “Sleeping Beauty 
and the Dialectical Awakening: On the Potential of Dialectic for International Relations”, Millennium: 
Journal of International Studies (Vol. 25, No. 2, 1996), pp. 399-423. 
81 Justin Rosenberg, The Follies of Globalisation Theory: Polemical Essays (London: Verso, 2000), p. 3. 
                                                                      Benno Teschke 
 
34 
 
change. And if that question cannot be answered, the snake keeps chasing its 
own tail. 
 
Clio’s Cave Reloaded: Theory over History, Structure over Agency 
This tension between causation and description – better: the absorption of 
explanation into observable regularities - manifests itself not only at the level of a 
problematic conception of theory and its equivocal reach. It becomes even 
stronger when the nomological-deductive conception of theory is applied to 
specific historical cases, generating an absolute opposition between a 
nomothetical theoreticism – the objective laws of motion of uneven and combined 
development – and a subsequent switch towards either a theoretically essentially 
unsecured or arbitrary historical register in concrete analyses. UCD, to recall, does 
not aim to withdraw into a self-sufficient and abstract theoreticism, which 
disavows historical research and interrogation. It is meant to explain history and 
should therefore, though this is nowhere stated, be subject to the standard 
criteria of disproof and falsification through the testing of its retrodictions (and 
presumably predictions) in dialogue with empirical evidence and counter-evidence 
– the historical method in the sense of the logic of historical research as the final 
court of appeal. If these non-confirmationist empirical controls are not taken 
seriously, then another form of circularity beckons, as the conclusions (of 
historical research) are already contained in the theoretical premises. 
But how do theoretical presuppositions and empirical data relate to each 
other in UCD? Here, several strategies seem to be in operation, sometimes 
individually, sometimes simultaneously. (i) The switch to history either marshals, 
corrals, and regiments the historical material deductively (i.e. reasoning from an 
aprioristic axiomatic set of premises) and selectively (for no empirical analysis can 
fully grasp the complete panoply of external and internal determinations of any 
specific process or event) to establish an alignment with the theoretical 
presuppositions. This form of self-validation immunises theory against empirical 
surprises and arranges history in accordance with a pre-conceived theory. “As 
such, this stands as a view of history as the eternal underlaborer – a source of 
data to be mined as theoretical abstractions demand”.82 Theoretical determinacy 
leads to empirical determinacy. Selection bias excludes those instances and 
episodes that do not comply with theoretical presuppositions. This is the (ab-)use 
of history as proof. (ii) Alternatively, it acknowledges empirical contingencies and 
messiness in a more open-ended register, pretending that this leaves the 
theoretical premises undisturbed and intact at a “higher level of abstraction” by 
retreating into ever thinner generalisations, which simultaneously undermine their 
explanatory power. Here, messiness and contingencies are externalised as non-
theorisable (because they are not “patterned”), forming an un-accounted for 
empiricist excess, while theory retreats into the unassailable citadel of the general 
                                                          
82 Hobson, Lawson, Rosenberg, op.cit. in note 12, p. 3361. 
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abstraction. Specificity is precluded from interacting with and potentially 
challenging the theoretical apparatus that guides research. As no conceptual net, 
a likely retort would suggest, is sufficiently close-meshed and can be cast wide 
enough to capture the infinitesima of historical complexity, much catch would 
simply slip through the meshes. Theoretical determinacy leads to empirical 
indeterminacy. This is not the use of history as disproof, as required by the 
historical method, but the (ab-)use of history as extra-theoretical surplus to intra-
theoretical requirement. (iii) Finally, specificities and contingencies are neutralised 
by their capture through a series of infinite ad hoc additions to the nomological 
base-line – the patching up of holes in the wide-meshed conceptual net. Empirical 
indeterminacy leads to theoretical indeterminacy. 
In any case, significant degrees of violence have to be done to the 
richness of history to orchestrate a “fit” between theory and history. Ultimately, 
however, theory and history drift apart, inhabiting two different forms of reality, 
licensing a dualism – causally deductive explanation here, unsecured and 
opportunistic empirical description there - constantly littered with protective 
clauses. The result is a growing gap between a rigid conception of a structural 
theory, which proscribes causal regularities that should engender identical effects 
across time and space, and an arbitrary mobilisation of agential history leading to 
either theoretical confirmation, extra-theoretical dismissal of specificities, or 
theoretical adhockery. And this reveals the great absence and the missing link 
between theory and history: an epistemological emphasis on agency and praxis. 
For while historical agency is radically expunged from the theoretical premises of 
UCD, the switch to historical description amply repopulates the social landscape 
with agents, if primarily, as we will see in a moment, as exemplifications of a 
super-ordinate logic. While agency is powerfully detailed empirically, it is not 
admitted and problematised theoretically. This drives a wedge between theory 
and history, as theory forms an irrefutable conceptual a priori. 
If the relation between theoretical presuppositions and historical-empirical 
research is precarious, the relation between theory and agency is asymmetric. It 
belongs, perhaps, to the standard responses of anyone who thinks dialectically to 
remind us of an old paradox: the tighter laws in the social sciences are formulated, 
the more agency is squeezed out – the more the chances for conscious change 
are reduced – in fact: ruled out. Indeed, the tighter sociological laws are 
articulated, the lesser the chances to use critical social science as a guide to 
action: as a strategic guide to emancipatory intervention on the terrain of political 
struggle. Social science turns affirmative by positing social-scientific laws outside 
any authorship, rendering agency – social, political, intellectual – passive, supine 
and compliant. Something similar applies to the objectification of agency and 
rationality (subjectivity) in UCD. For with the relapse of UCD as a world-historical 
law into a type of methodological positivism—a general nomological–deductive 
covering law—that operates behind the backs of humans, an understanding of IHS 
(and social science) emerges which, quite contrary to the original promise of 
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socialising and historicising the rich variety of (geo-)political rationalities in IHS, 
relapses into a structurally derived, closed and unitary conception of rationality 
and agency. 
For how is agency conceptualised in UCD? What is posited as the subject 
of history are not human beings in their concrete social relations, but rather “the 
super-entity of human social development as a whole”.83 And since development 
is by definition uneven, multi-linear, and combined, it is UCD itself which poses as 
the subject of history. This move performs the classical inversion of the relation 
between subjects and predicates, which Marx objected to in his critique of Hegel’s 
positing of the Spirit as the mega-subject of history. For in UCD it is development 
per se that operates analogously as the mega-subject of history, while people are 
conceived as mere predicates, acting out the imperatives of inter-societal 
development as appendices. Marx, of course, suggested turning this procedure 
around: positing practical human beings in their social relations who create, or 
maybe not, development. 
And what kind of conception of political agency does UCD imply? If the 
collective subject of the course of history is development itself, then – thus spoke 
the law – it follows that politicians and diplomats (Caesar, Napoleon, Palmerston, 
Bismarck) appear as the proverbial Hegelian managers of the world-spirit on 
UCD’s horse-back. Either “state-managers” have to be conceived as fully-
cognisant, omniscient, and rational actors, which grasp, digest, and process all 
information and determinations arising from the uneven and combined character 
of their domestic and geopolitical contexts to pre-ordained ends (“whip of external 
necessity”/”privilege of backwardness”), or they have to be conceptualised as fully 
determined and empty throughputs, processing social and geopolitical data 
automatically as executioners of a logic beyond their volition and comprehension 
(“the cunning of UCD”). In this perspective, people are reduced to bearers of 
ulterior structural determinations as decisions are not made, but simply result. 
Decisions – policies - are presented as outcomes in an input-throughput-output 
model. But no decision can ever be fully resolved back into its antecedent 
preconditions, as context never translates on a one-to-one basis into text. This 
requires the historian not to assume that an outcome was preordained by a 
“rational” and “law-like” reaction to context (international and domestic), but to 
take the option of a disjuncture between the totality (provided this could ever be 
established ex post factum) of causal conditions which preceded any event or 
decision, and the outcome of that event or decision seriously. Inter-societal and 
cross-societal determinations can never function as antecedent structural causes 
which determine a specific course of action, as they can maximally specify the 
causally enabling conditions of possibility within which agency takes place. The 
                                                          
83 Rosenberg, “Why is there no International Historical Sociology”, op. cit. in note 52, p. 332. Again, 
Selwyn’s counter-reading is instructive as the specific resolution of social conflicts determines whether or 
not the “whip of external necessity” holds causally and whether its effects turn into the disadvantages 
rather than advantages of backwardness. However, if the locus of explanation travels to socio-political 
conflicts, UCD’s status as a universal causal law looses its meaning by turning into an “opportunity”. It 
then emerges that the law of UCD is inherently indeterminate. Selwyn, op. cit. in note 64. 
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efficacy or non-efficacy of structures is only revealed in and through social 
practices and cannot be pre-judged. A denial of this would re-invite the standard 
charge of structural-functionalism: outcomes are a function of the structural 
determinations of UCD. And behind this lurks the tacit idea that human activity 
and its effects, whether intended or unintended, can have no effect on the 
general law. Yet, subjectivity cannot be simply “read off” structural configurations 
of socio-political relations in the sense of cause and effect, as situated agents – 
individually and collectively – draw on and develop repertories of experiences, 
which do not simply combine existing power relations into “amalgamations”, but 
attempt to modify, circumvent and “escape” structural imperatives – often with 
unintended consequences. In the process, innovation – or indeterminacy - is a 
constant possibility.84 Social agency is therefore not something that enters the 
historical analysis from without – as a static and pre-defined agential rationality or 
as an empty vessel – but something that requires constant historicisation and 
specification in relational contexts from within. Agents “interpret” structural 
imperatives in historically distinct ways. This implies a hermeneutic move. 
This absence of an active notion of political agency in UCD amounts, by 
inference, to the erasure of any significance and partial autonomy granted to 
statecraft, strategy, diplomacy, and the formation of foreign policy.85 Where this is 
descriptively admitted in UCD, it is not theoretically covered by UCD. In this sense, 
UCD appears as a general IR theory without politics, diplomacy and geopolitics, 
shadowing again its Neo-Realist model. The course of history appears thus not 
only de-subjectified and de-socialised, it is fundamentally de-politicised. The real 
subjects, human beings, are demoted to the status of predicates. Individuals 
appear as personifications of social-scientific categories. 
UCD articulates a meta-historical law whose scientistic connotations 
translate into a structuralism—similar to Neo-Realism—which reduces agency to 
                                                          
84 Samuel Knafo, “Critical Approaches and the Legacy of the Agent/Structure Debate in International 
Relations”, Cambridge Review of International Affairs (Vol. 23, No.3, 2010), pp. 493-516. 
85 And this raises a series of more straightforward logical and historical questions, which cannot be 
resolved from within UCD’s own theoretical premises: What, for example, if a more “advanced” but 
power-politically smaller polity – say the 17th Century Dutch Low Countries after independence – faces 
less “advanced” but power-politically stronger polities – like Old Regime France, leading to near-defeat of 
the Dutch? Does this suspend the logic of the whip of external necessity, lashed by theoretical fiat by the 
more advanced over the less advanced polity? What if two less “advanced” polities, like late 18th France 
and the pre-independence American settler colonies form an alliance against a more “advanced” polity, 
Britain, leading to British defeat? What if a more “advanced” polity, say 18th Century Britain, forms an 
alliance with a smaller more “backward”  polity, say Prussia, enabling in the Seven Years’ War its survival 
against a mixed coalition (France, Russia, Austria) of more advanced/backward states vis-à-vis Prussia? 
What if a more “advanced” polity, say early 19th Century Britain, forms a mixed alliance with more 
backward polities, like Russia, Austria and Prussia (institutionalised in the Congress of Vienna) to re-
impose and freeze for strategic reasons “backwardness” (dynastic legitimacy, restoration, social 
repression) in Central and Eastern Europe? Is this a case of international de-development? Diplomacy, 
strategy, and alliance formation are always acts of calculated statecraft, which cut across the directional 
developmental logic of advance and backwardness and cannot be “read off’ the mechanistic general law 
of UCD. And according to what criteria do we know whether one polity is more advanced than another? 
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the faithful enactment of imperatives beyond human control or volition. 86 
Historical development is conceived as a subjectless and autogenerative process 
operating outside and above the wills of social agents. What counts as an 
explanation is the accumulation of international and domestic determinations 
which reduce the room of manoeuvre for agency to zero. While structural 
imperatives are a constant in human history, they cannot be conceived as 
translating into “logics of action” which fully explain outcomes, as these 
imperatives are always refracted through individual and collective social agency – 
some conscious, some less so - open to diverse and non-derivable results. 
According to UCD, however, outcomes in the social world appear as deduced from 
antecedent causes, leading to a conceptualization of agency as fully determined, 
passive–receptive and, ultimately, non-agential. In fact, agency is not deemed to 
be a category that requires separate theoretical attention. It is rather relegated to 
the sphere of historical description, as agents enter the equation only as bearers 
and dupes of laws outside their grasp and imagination. It is therefore hard to see 
how UCD conceptualizes politics and geopolitics, other than as a derivative and 
automatic response to the intertwining of outside and inside pressures, instead of 
reading both as contested and purposive praxes, which contain multiple moments 
of indeterminacy. UCD is not the law that governs historical change, it is an 
abstraction from the plurality of historical trajectories and their interrelations that 
stand in need of explanation through the specification of their real dynamics, 
grounded in human praxis. But in UCD, praxis appears objectified. In this sense, 
UCD is meta-theoretically of a piece with the modes-of-production structuralism 
operative in the Empire of Civil Society. 
Of General Abstractions and Marxist Concept-Formation 
This gap between theory and history – between abstraction and 
concretion – seems to find a Marxist resolution as the law of UCD, plus sundry 
other categories, is justified with recourse to the procedure of “general abstraction” 
apocryphally modelled on Karl Marx’s notes in the Grundrisse on “production-in-
general”.87 Here, Marx starts by insisting that “whenever we speak of production, 
then, what is meant is always production at a definite stage of social development 
– production by social individuals”.88 Marx continues by speculating that it might 
be helpful to identify the elements which are “common” or “general” to all 
production. Production-in-General as a transhistorical category may be useful, 
Marx suggests, as a “rational abstraction in so far as it really brings out and fixes 
the common element and thus saves us repetition”. In analogy, UCD is developed 
as a general abstraction to extricate the common element in world history – the 
multiplicity of political collectivities and their interactive uneven development 
across time and space. 
                                                          
86 “Inter-societal order is an emergent, autopoietic property of social reproduction.” Rosenberg, op.cit. in 
note 52, p. 323.  
87 Ibid., p. 319. 
88 Karl Marx, Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy (London: Penguin Books, 
1973), p. 85. 
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But what fails to transpire in the handling of general abstractions in UCD 
is that Marx proceeds to qualify and ultimately reject the procedure of general 
abstraction as bourgeois mystification, since the historically specific 
determinations of concrete production cannot be grasped by the general 
abstraction. There is a non-correspondence between the general abstraction and 
the multiple and dissimilar phenomena from which the general concept is 
abstracted from. As classical political economy had naturalised and mystified 
capitalist production by conflating it with production-in-general, production pure 
and simple or production per se, Marx opposed the procedure of trans-historical 
concept-formation by insisting on the de-naturalisation and historicisation of 
concepts as pertaining to historically specific social relations. For “this general 
category, this common element sifted out by comparison, is itself segmented 
many times over and splits into different determinations (…)” and “just those 
things which determine their development, i.e. the elements which are not 
general and common, must be separated out from the determinations valid for 
production as such, so that in their unity (…) their essential difference is not 
forgotten.” And Marx concludes that “if there is no production in general, then 
there is also no general production”, “(…) the so-called general preconditions of 
all production are nothing more than these abstract moments with which no real 
historical stage of production can be grasped”.89 In fact, the move towards the 
general abstraction as the object of knowledge either suppresses or distorts the 
move towards historical concretion. For where the journey from the general 
abstraction to any historically concrete manifestation is undertaken, the general 
abstraction either loses its status as a general explanatory formula, as the 
“explanation” is of necessity re-anchored in historically specific social relations 
(revealing in the process the general abstraction as a mystification), or reifies 
historical agents by aligning their activities and subjectivities with the logic of the 
abstract pre-supposition: mere bearers of laws.90 
                                                          
89 Ibid., pp. 85, 88. 
90  The process of abstraction implies therefore abstracting out a singular feature from a class of 
phenomena to render it amenable to a higher and more encompassing category by disregarding all other 
features. Waltz exemplifies this, when he suggests that theory-construction involves simplification 
through the isolation, abstraction, aggregation and idealisation of facts. In this sense, for example, the 
conception of humans in classical political economy, homo oeconomicus as a utility-maximiser, is 
constructed by emphasising, exaggerating and absolutising certain features of humans in a one-sided 
manner, while others – all other features of humans’ subjectivity - are ignored. This not only reduces the 
richness of human subjectivity to a false essence of economic calculation, but objectifies and reifies 
human beings by rendering the conception of wo/man functional to a market economy. Subjects become 
objects. Through this reductionist procedure, the conception of humans is rendered compatible with and 
is subjected to the law-like imperatives of the economy, enabling the modelling, formalisation, and even 
mathematisation of human behaviour. Everything else is externalised as non-generalisable and therefore 
non-theorisable in positivistic version of the social sciences. The danger in conceiving the task of the 
social sciences as the formation of abstractions, and a fortiori general abstractions, resides therefore in 
the positing of these abstractions as external objectivations to which human activity is theoretically 
rendered compliant. And if it turns out to be non-compliant, it is ignored or declared irrational and extra-
theoretical. In this sense, the abstraction constitutes idealism, divorced from reality. The same procedure 
is at play in Waltz’s abstract conception of international anarchy – another idealism. 
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Analogously, as “bourgeois” IR Theory – here in the form of Waltz - 
elevates the notion of international systemic structure (plus anarchy, the security-
dilemma, and the balance-of-power) to a timeless condition and therefore Neo-
Realism to a transhistorical theory of IR, UCD affirms and reinforces this 
“bourgeois” form of concept-formation by accepting “the international” pure and 
simple as a transhistorical category sub specie aeternitatis, defined as “more-than-
one society” – a numerical definition of the international, in which quality is 
replaced by quantity.91 The corollary of complying with the demands of “bourgeois” 
universal concept-formation is that the general abstraction is, by definition, devoid 
of any social content and must appear as a flat tautology due to its very generality: 
the higher the abstraction, the thinner its historical content, the more obvious its 
character as an a-historic and even anti-historic abstraction. The danger in 
definitionally fixing the essence of a particular phenomenon resides in the 
tendency of retreating into ever more inessential, i.e. empty, un-historical, 
disembodied, and abstract (here understood in its common and vernacular 
meaning of “vague”), over-generalisations and truisms. 
And a second dilemma follows: as with mainstream IR theorists’ concept 
of the timeless category of the international, the historical and the transhistorical 
are conflated in UCD’s deployment of the international (and any other universal 
category). For what Marx, according to Derek Sayer, reacted against when he 
criticised the bourgeois economists’ fetishisation of concepts applies here pari 
passu: “That same double dehistoricizing is manifest: ignoring the concept’s roots 
in a particular form of society goes along with universalisation of properties of that 
society under the guise of pure conceptual abstraction”, yielding the verities of 
Realist lore: the international is the international is the international. 92  Thus 
semantically neutered, these supra-historical abstractions generate either 
analytical anachronisms (as we will show in a moment), as they operate with a 
modernist vocabulary that is essentially abstracted from a specific historical 
context, and retrojected and super-imposed on world-history at large. Or they 
disappear into the sphere of space-time indifferent and transcendental categories 
with which no specific historical phenomenon can be grasped.93 The first option 
re-invites the quintessential historical-sociological charge of chrono-fetishism and 
tempo-centrism.94 The second option drifts towards an idealism similar to Platonic 
                                                          
91 General abstractions, as opposed to Marx’s concrete abstractions, are therefore similar to Max Weber’s 
procedure of sociological ideal-type formation, which also extricate and distil typical features from a wide 
variety of historical phenomena into a concentrated pure type, claiming general heuristic, but not causal 
or law-like, validity. 
92 Derek Sayer, The Violence of Abstraction: The Analytic Foundations of Historical Materialism (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1987), p. 141. 
93 In his critique of Althusser, Edward Thompson comments that “such idealism consists, not in the 
positing or denial of the primacy of an ulterior material world, but in a self-generating conceptual 
universe which imposes its own ideality upon the phenomena of material and social existence, rather 
than engaging in continual dialogue with these. (…) The category has attained to a primacy over its 
material referent; the conceptual structure hangs above and dominates social being.” Edward P. 
Thompson, “The Poverty of Theory: Or an Orrery of Errors”,  in E. P. Thompson, The Poverty of Theory 
& Other Essays (London: Merlin, 1978), p. 205. 
94 Hobden and Hobden, op. cit. in note 6. 
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ideas or, to the degree that it connotes an abstraction from world history, 
Weberian ideal-types. Yet, an obsession with essentialist ontology (seeking to fix 
the essence of things definitionally) is misplaced, as phenomena result only in our 
cumulative social interaction historically. For what was the definition of the 
international? More than one society! But what is a society? 
Marxist IR theory’s procedure of concept-formation should therefore not 
aspire to the formulation of the notion of the international – or any other category 
- in general as free-floating devices, but invites us towards a process of 
specification through constantly adjusting and narrowing the distance between a 
phenomenon and its concept. Classically, this was envisioned by Marx as a 
process of cognitive concretisation from the real-abstract, the empirical object, to 
the thought-concrete, the concept, which successively narrows the non-identity 
between the object of investigation and the concept as a concrete concept.95 This 
can be understood as the dialectical method of concept-formation as a “mode of 
apprehension” of reality. 96  This procedure of concept-formation serves the 
purpose of historicising, socialising and specifying concepts by laying bare the 
human authorship grounded in historically distinct social relations and praxes 
which, at any moment in time, construct phenomena, including political 
geography, in infinitely variable ways. This points to a radically historicist method 
of concept-formation. 
The objective is to understand the international and any other phenomena 
not as analytically abstract but as historically concrete and therefore specific 
categories, grounded in historically concrete praxes of political geographies. The 
purpose of concept-formation is not to work up towards ever more general 
categories, which once locked into a rigorous definition abstracted from history, 
inhabit an Ideenhimmel (a heaven of ideas) which subsequently descends back on 
earth by rendering social phenomena compliant with their ideality (the 
subsumption model of covering laws), but to develop a historicist sensibility which 
constantly forces concept-formation to “keep sailing close to the wind”. This 
implies keep reducing the non-identity between concept and phenomenon through 
a process of approximation by developing historically specific categories. This 
means that empirical research must actually alter theoretical concepts. This can 
                                                          
95 Marx, op. cit. in note 88, p. 101. 
96  “Ontological essences, understood as timeless structures, are fundamentally opposed to the very 
process of historical becoming. In the sixth thesis on Feuerbach, Marx emphasises that “the human 
essence is no abstraction inherent in each single individual. In its reality, it is the ensemble of human 
relations.” As these ensembles are ever-changing, the conceptual comprehension of this flux – in order 
to fend off the danger of conceptual abstractions and concomitant reifications – has to come to terms 
with this flux “fluently”: Three conclusions follow: (1) science (thinking) is on the wrong track if it sees 
its primary purpose as the pursuit of positive and universal social laws, or in “once-and-for-all” 
definitions; (2) concepts have to remain malleable and open for new concretisations; (3) the process of 
conceptual thinking can therefore never be terminated.” Heine and Teschke, 1996, op. cit. in note 80, p. 
414. Thompson embraced the notion of dialectics as a “mode of apprehension of a fluent and 
contradictory eventuation”, but conceived it more as a learned and intuitive craft of the practising 
historian, resistant to abstract formalisation. E.P. Thompson, 1978, op. cit. in note 93, p. 305. 
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be performed by tracing the changing form of the object of inquiry as a relational 
contradiction-in-motion without relapsing into conceptual closure, fixed definitions, 
and reifications. If general abstractions are not handled as heuristic devices and 
brought in dialogue with evidence and counter-evidence, but remain charged a 
priori with fixed definitional content and elevated to explanatory formulas of 
universal reach, then their apparent rigour turns quickly into rigor mortis. 
“Categories are the abstract ideal expression of (…) social relations. 
Indeed, the categories are no more eternal than the relations they express. They 
are historical and transitory products. There is a continual movement of growth in 
productive forces, of destruction in social relations, of formation in ideas; the only 
immutable thing is the abstraction of movement – mors immortalis (immortal 
death)”. 97 
Let us exemplify and clarify the two ways of concept-formation – the 
idealist-subsumptionst and the dialectical. Marxism and many other non-Marxist 
traditions in the social sciences and historiography operate with abstract 
categories, like feudalism, capitalism, bourgeois revolution, hegemony, or 
absolutism, the state, the market, territoriality, diplomacy, foreign policy, 
understood as heuristic devices or ideal-types, which spell out their ideality in a 
fairly general definition, meant to capture a class of fairly similar real-empirical 
phenomena. Thereafter, however, the two modes of concept-formation diverge. 
For whereas in the subsumptionist mode the research process is organised 
towards the confirmation of the general category or the covering law (the 
research objective), rendering the empirical data compliant with the general 
presupposition or disqualifying anomalies or counter-evidence as un-theorisable 
empiricist excess, the dialectical mode suggests a different strategy. For it brings 
these general categories into a dialogue with the empirical evidence – perhaps a 
banal point, but one that is routinely forgotten - by the careful application of the 
method of historical research and the testing of concepts against the 
historiographical evidence. This cannot take the form of a biased selection of 
confirmationist cases (which only validates the abstract category), but needs to be 
prosecuted, ideally, against the full array of confirming and non-confirming 
empirical cases (minimally two) in an open-ended process of research. History 
(empirical controls), in the form of diachronic and synchronic comparisons of 
specific cases, provides a crucial corrective to the logic of generalisation.98 For this 
turn to history involves not only taking historical scholarship and evidence 
seriously (a massive task for the social scientist in itself), it implies resisting the 
                                                          
97 Karl Marx, “Letter from Marx to Pavel Vasilyevich Annenkov”, in Marx Engels Collected Works, vol. 38: 
Letters of Marx and Engels 1846 (Moscow: Progress Publishers 1975), p. 95. 
98 This is exemplarily shown in Robert Brenner’s famous demonstration that general structural pressures 
in late medieval and early modern Europe – demographic and commercial – generated widely diverging 
results in different regions of Europe (France, England, East-Elbia), as these pressures were refracted 
through different prevailing social relations and social conflicts in each region. Robert Brenner, “The 
Agrarian Roots of European Capitalism”, in T.H. Aston and C.H.E. Philpin (eds.), The Brenner Debate: 
Agrarian Class Structure and Economic Development in Pre-Industrial Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1985), p. 213-327. 
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structuralist urge to assimilate and subsume different cases under the over-
generalising remit of the general category. 
Dialectical concept-formation proceeds thus inversely through a process of 
conceptual specification, clarification and concretisation, which tests, refines, 
revises and, if necessary, abandons the general abstraction. In the process of the 
journey from the abstraction to the concretion, the general category loses its 
ideality as different cases of feudalism, absolutism, capitalism or bourgeois 
revolutions (or state, the market, territoriality, diplomacy, foreign policy) may or 
may not evince significant differences in their empirical manifestations. The 
purpose of this procedure is not to first acknowledge and then cavalierly retract 
(or abstract from) specificities – by either demoting variations to variations on a 
common theme, or by degrading specificities to extra-theoretical contingencies, or 
by smuggling in separate orders of reality (captured by systematic sociology or 
general IR theory here and specific historiography there, inhabiting two different 
epistemological universes). The purpose is rather to bring out, emphasise and 
theoretically anchor these peculiarities by retrieving the social agency which 
accounts for synchronic and diachronic inter-case differences, rather than cross-
case identities. And this emphasis on social construction also dynamises a static 
category as a processual category – a historical category – whose fixed 
definitional essence loses its stability and heuristic value as it permutates over 
time and in space. The trajectories of feudalism and absolutism in “France” and 
“England” were different; medieval territoriality is unlike modern territoriality; the 
“bourgeois revolutions” in a variety of countries cannot be subsumed under the 
same general category; British 19th Century hegemony turns out to be hardly 
discernable and was very different from US hegemony; American capitalism is 
very different from German capitalism, etc. 99  And the explanation for these 
differences does not reside in the abstract but in the specific, re-admitting social 
praxes to the center of the analysis. 
This procedure, then, applies not only to “static” categories, but also to 
“categories of movement” – Marxist and non-Marxist alike – like “the laws of 
motion” or other “tendencies” of the feudal or capitalist modes of production. 
                                                          
99 The Myth of 1648 applied this procedure to the cases of feudalism and absolutism. Chapter two sets 
out a general and abstract theory of feudalism as a heuristic device, while chapter 3 moves from this 
generality to particularities, which are not derived from or subsumed under the abstract category, but 
“explained” through the recourse to historically concrete social relations and conflicts by switching to 
spatio-temporal specificities. The same is done for the idealised category of absolutism in chapter 5. And 
the same is done in chapter 8 against the Neo-Weberian concept of military rivalry, which suggests that 
early modern geopolitical competition isomorphically directs processes of state-formation towards the 
ideal-type of the “fiscal-military state”. History is here not regarded as an illustration or exemplification of 
a pre-conceived logic, but the necessary dialogical partner in the business of more concrete concept-
formations. Teschke, op.cit. in note 17. The same procedure is pursued in the Deutscher Lecture for the 
category of “bourgeois revolution”. Teschke, 2005, op. cit. in note 56. And the same procedure is 
pursued by Hannes Lacher and Julian Germann with respect to US and British hegemony, see Lacher and 
Germann, “Before Hegemony: Britain, Free Trade, and Nineteenth-Century World Order Revisited”, 
International Studies Review (Vol.14, No.1,  2012), pp.  99-124. 
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Here, again, the objective is to test these general categories against the empirical 
material, drawn from a variety of cases in a comparative perspective, and refine, 
adapt or abandon these general categories when found out of sync with the real-
empirical.100 This implies that specific “instances” or “examples” cannot be simply 
subsumed under the general category (which fetishises and reifies the 
phenomenon under investigation), leaving the latter intact, but inversely, that the 
ultimate cognitive aim leads back to the conversion of generality into specificity. 
As the expectations derived from the general category are often, though not 
necessarily always, confounded by counter-evidence, we are per force led back to 
asking why these “anomalies” recur. And this disconnection between theoretical 
expectation and empirical counter-evidence forces us to retrieve human agency as 
the final source of differences, accounting for these variations and specificities. 
This does not imply the abandonment of “theory” for “empiricism”, re-
inviting the charge, recurrently raised by the defenders of the Marxist orthodoxy, 
of an intellectual abdication to randomisation, contingency, and messiness and the 
overwhelming of theory by narrative. 101  It rather exhorts us to establish, 
epistemologically, that human beings in their social relations – in their diverse 
praxes - are the starting-point and end-point in the process of investigation.102 
The re-admission of history as the terrain of epistemology requires therefore a 
greater degree of precision to ascertain how agents navigate power relations in 
concretu. It is their open-ended making of history, rather than the alignment of 
                                                          
100 This was performed by Robert Brenner in his historical critique of Guy Bois’s category of a “declining 
rate of feudal levy” – another abstraction which could not be verified in historical research.  A common 
way to “get around” these specificities in the social sciences is to build up a casuistry of typological sub-
types, leading to a conceptual architecture, which defines general categories at the highest level of 
abstraction, only to break-up this idealised and pure category by the addition of further sub-types, and 
further sub-sub-types, as in the work of Max Weber. The resultant of sociological ideal-type formation is 
best illustrated in Weber’s own Economy and Society – a universal compendium and inventory of 
sociological categories, whose universality is immediately revoked by the re-admission of more impure 
sub-types as the distance between general concept and concrete phenomenon shrinks on the journey 
from sociological category to history. Max Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive 
Sociology (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1978). Weber never elaborated ideal-types of 
international orders, but one would assume that this may have been constructed around qualitative, 
rather than quantitative traits, generating substantive sub-types, organised either around the political 
communities that composed such orders (states, empires, monarchies, poleis, etc.) or the character of 
their relations (anarchy, hierarchy, heteronomy, hegemony, etc). Waltz, in contrast, did suggest a 
numerical definition of international orders, generating minimal predictions around them, as multi-polar 
orders were deemed unstable, whereas bi-polar orders were stable. UCD also suggests a numerical 
definition (‘more-than-one’), but little can be derived from this. 
101 Alex Callinicos, “How to Solve the Many-States Problem: A Reply to the Debate”, Cambridge Review of 
International Affairs, 2009, (Vol. 22, No. 1, 2009), p. 96. Callinicos’s alternative method to introduce 
“non-deductively” ever more concrete determinations of the capitalist mode of production, including the 
inter-state system, still fails to divulge where this inter-state system is coming from. It is simply posited 
and then kept alive through the “centrifugal pull” of UCD. If the inter-state system cannot be deduced 
from the capital-relation, as he rightly suggests, then how do we explain it on Marxist premises without 
letting it roll as a loose cannon on the Marxist ship, eagerly claimed by the Neo-Weberians as proof of 
Marxism’s society-centeredness? 
102 In his critique of Althusser, E. P. Thompson suggested that he confused empirical procedures and 
empirical controls – the historical method – with “something which he calls “empiricism”’. E. P. 
Thompson, op. cit. in note 93, p. 224. 
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history with pre-conceived general categories, whose overarching logic is simply 
acted out by human beings, which moves center-stage. For as human beings 
make their own history, even if not under conditions of their choosing, the 
common temptation – in structuralist versions of Marxism and in so many other 
structuralist versions of the social sciences (including Neo-Realism) – is always to 
privilege the conditions, the context, of action and to derive the agency behind 
action from this context, rather than to take seriously the “making”, i.e. the text of 
conscious action, which contains the nucleus and explanans of historical 
differences. This is captured in the epistemological postulate of historicity. What 
this requires, then, is a non-deterministic conception of agency. How do people 
grasp and rationalise a specific context subjectively and experientially, informing 
their actions? But since this cannot be specified in the abstract, as in utilitarianism 
or variants of rational-choice theory, as this would lead us back into the trap of 
essentialism and definitionalism, we need to fall back on history and specify 
agency as concrete agency – a turn towards a historicist conception of agency.103 
This is in line with Marx’s speculation, however cryptic, dense and 
incomplete, that the method of critical political economy and hence historical 
materialism implies a double journey from the real-abstract as the point of 
departure in observation (Anschauung), via a descent into the specification of its 
simple determinations (its disaggregation into simple concepts), to the subsequent 
ascent to the rich reproduction of the phenomenon as a thought-concrete (the re-
aggregation of determinations into concrete concepts), as “a rich totality of many 
determinations and relations”. For Marx, this was “a product of the working-up of 
observation and conception into concepts”. 104   In this sense, Marx does not 
suggest a positivistic science of history – either in terms of a nomothetic 
subsumption model or in terms of Popper’s ill-ascribed teleological historicism 
(ascribed to Hegel and Marx) in the sense of history as the self-unfolding of the 
Spirit to a pre-ordained end (reason) or the self-unfolding of a pre-programmed 
sequence of ascending stages in the modes of production towards another pre-
ordained end (freedom) – nor a systemic logic of capital positing itself as the 
subject of (capitalist) history in a self-unfolding and self-actualising process, but a 
historicist approach to historical concept-formation with no fixed guarantees.105 
But can we “get around” conceptual abstractions? PM equally suggests a 
general abstraction as a starting point, located in historically contested social 
                                                          
103 “The concrete content of human agency, or praxis, cannot be defined in the abstract. We can only 
grasp its meaning as a determinate moment in respective concrete historical situations.” Heine and 
Teschke, 1996, op. cit. in note 80, p. 414. 
104 Marx, 1973, op. cit. in note 88, p. 101. This procedure of concept-formation remains incomplete, 
since the impression may arise that the conceptualisation of a specific phenomenon is merely the 
resultant of the aggregate of external, if multi-sided, determinations, which leaves the crucial proviso – 
that these determinations need also to be analysed and refracted in terms of their conscious or non-
conscious cognitive appropriation by the subject, i.e. subjectively – under-specified. 
105 Samuel Knafo, “The Fetishising Subject in Marx’s Capital’”, Capital & Class (Vol. 26, No.1 2002), pp. 
145-175. 
                                                                      Benno Teschke 
 
46 
 
property relations or politically-constituted property relations, rather than in 
production per se, since this category often leads to an economistic, productivist 
and sometimes even technicist – and in some versions techno-determinist - bias. 
But this heuristic device does not pretend to qualify as a general and causal 
covering law (or even as a general IR theory). It rather suggests a premise that 
facilitates the historicisation of social and geopolitical relations in time and space, 
including strategies of territorialisation. And the notion of property relations 
(rather than property structures or property rights) opens the door towards the 
relationality of people (their inter-subjectivity), as they agree on, contest, or 
transform these property relations in historically specific ways. In this context, the 
emphasis on the political in Marxism was decisive as it led to a redefinition of the 
concept “mode of production” in a socio-political and thus anti-economistic 
direction. Whereas many Marxisms had defined a mode of production as 
comprising an economic base, with its own “laws of motion” in opposition to 
extraneous social factors and a derivative or corresponding political super-
structure, Wood and Brenner suggested that this rigid separation in orthodox 
versions of Marxism between economic objectivity – which did all the explanation 
- and socio-political subjectivity – which was relegated to the sphere of history 
and contingency – reproduced in fact the “bourgeois ideology” of classical political 
economy which “discovered “the economy” in the abstract and began emptying 
capitalism of its social and political content”.106 This reproduced, rather than re-
conceptualised, the liberal myth of the self-regulating market governed by the 
“invisible hand”. In contrast, Wood suggested that “for Marx, the ultimate secret 
of capitalist production is a political one”, since “he treats the economy itself not 
as a network of disembodied forces but, like the political “sphere”, as a set of 
social relations”.107 This led ultimately to the reconceptualization of the category 
“mode of production” as a “mode of exploitation”, framed in terms of class power: 
“A mode of production is not simply a technology but a social organization 
of productive activity; and a mode of exploitation is a relationship of power. 
Furthermore, the power relationship that constitutes the nature and extent of 
exploitation is a matter of political organization within and between the 
contending classes. In the final analysis, the relation between appropriators and 
producers rests on the relative strengths of classes, and this is largely determined 
by the internal organization and the political forces with which each enters into 
the class struggle.”108 
 And since modes of exploitation are not defined as economic phenomena 
– somehow outside of or preceding society and politics - but as socio-political 
relations, PM was able to draw the strategic lesson by alerting us to those aspects 
in which they are “actually contested: as relations of domination, as rights of 
property, as the power to organize and govern production and appropriation. In 
                                                          
106 Ellen Meiksins Wood, “The Separation of the Economic and the Political in Capitalism”, New Left 
Review, (No.127, 1981),  p. 66. 
107 Ibid., p. 68. 
108 Ibid., p. 79. 
International Relations, Historical Materialism and the False Promise of International Historical Sociology 
 
 
47 
 
other words, the object of this theoretical stance is a practical one, to illuminate 
the terrain of struggle by viewing modes of production not as abstract structures 
but as they actually confront people who must act in relation to them”.109 The 
general category of social property relations has therefore an in-built emphasis on 
the praxes of people in certain relations, which admits, invites and requires by the 
same token historicity. This does not pre-judge the concrete content of 
relationality, agency and inter-subjectivity, as the “rules of reproduction” 
associated with historically specific social property relations indicate expectations, 
which have to be concretised and modified through the method of history in 
research. 110  The premise of social property relations desists therefore from 
positing a universal theory and suggests a general historicist perspective and, for 
IR purposes, a perspective on the social history of political geography and 
geopolitics. 
This implies not only an open-ended approach to history – rather than a 
general theory of history or IR developed from an extra-historical Archimedean 
point of view (the view from nowhere) - but an understanding of critical social 
science as a historically circumscribed (the view from somewhere) and intervening 
praxis as the results of (critical) history-writing feed back into the reproduction of 
society as a whole. This also denies the positivist postulate of an absolute 
distinction between a neutral observer here and the observed world here, subject 
and object, as the observer brings a knowledge-guiding interest – a value - to 
bear on his object-matter. And this subjective value can read the historical social 
world either as a laboratory for grand theory, which objectifies and naturalises its 
course in terms of eternal laws and timeless categories, forfeiting political 
responsibility in the process due to the impersonal and tragic logics of causal 
mechanisms, or it can read the social and historical world as a series of subjective 
and inter-subjective constructions, of which theory is one subjective emanation. 
This subjectivity leaves, outside of the more or less rigorously handled historical 
method, always an unspecifiable artful surplus to the practice and craft of the 
historian, as the medium of his or her thought remains (outside cliometrics) 
language, as expressed in his or her own style of writing. Historiography and 
historical sociology are therefore not governed by the methodological protocols of 
a nomothetic sociology or – a fortiori – a nomothetic IHS, but remain lodged in 
                                                          
109 Ibid., p. 77. It is ironic therefore that some critics of PM refer to its conception of capitalism as 
economistic or platonic, for the entire emphasis of PM – hence its name – is directed towards the re-
socialisation, re-politicisation and historicisation of capitalism as a contested relation, even if this aspect 
becomes submerged in Brenner’s and Wood’s later works. Capitalism is a historical and not a theoretical 
category. 
110 PM in IR draws more on the first wave of work in PM, developed in Robert Brenner’s and Ellen Wood’s 
writings in the context of the “Transition Debate”. Their later work is itself liable to the charge of 
structuralism. This relapse can be traced back to a proto-structuralism present in the concept of “rules of 
reproduction”. Hannes Lacher and the author indicated this problem by suggesting replacing this notion 
with a more open-ended notion of “ways of reproduction”. Hannes Lacher and Benno Teschke, “The 
Changing “Logics” of Capitalist Competition” , Cambridge Review of International Affairs (Vol.20, No. 4, 
2007), pp. 565-580. 
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the Arts and Humanities, even if the historical method remains a disciplinary 
anchor, which keeps the dialogue with the more systematic and empirical social 
sciences alive. Once all this is accepted, a switch from theoretical universal to 
historical specification – retrieving political geography as changing and malleable 
practices in time and space – is under way. But in UCD, the international is not 
understood “as a historical result but as history’s point of departure”.111 It follows 
that as there is no international-in-general, there is no general internationality. 
While this may sound like arcane Marxology, the discussion usefully 
frames the question of the adequate method for thinking about “the international” 
(or any other abstraction), either in terms of the “international-in-general” and 
UCD as a general law, or in terms of the particular social praxes that construct 
political geography in variable and historically specific ways. In her critique of 
Garry Cohen’s Karl Marx’s Theory of History: A Defense, Ellen Wood concluded 
that “any propositions about “production in general” will be rather empty and 
formal, even “trite” or tautological, since the real content of these “common 
elements” themselves depends precisely on their social determinations.”112 And 
she suggested that Marx’s purpose was “to focus attention not on “abstract 
matter” but on the social form that gives it reality; to indicate not the usefulness 
but the emptiness of this abstraction; and insofar as he draws our attention to the 
abstraction of material production from its particular social form, he does so to 
stress not what the abstraction reveals but what it conceals.” And her coup de 
grâce reads that a general abstraction is, in effect, “non-falsifiable. To the extent 
that it is true, it is trivial and tautological – as, perhaps, any historical “law” of 
such generality must be.”113 
To sum up: abstractions in social inquiry remain necessary and useful – 
every concept is an abstraction. Yet, the danger of social-scientific concept-
formation geared towards the building of general abstractions resides in the de-
historicisation of concepts as concrete concepts, definitional anachronism, empty 
essentialism, and the freezing of a reality-in-motion which constantly escapes 
fixed definitions. Marx suggested that there are violent abstractions which lead to 
ever thinner levels of generality, which carry the danger of mystification. And he 
insisted to decode these general abstractions as ideological targets, which require 
re-conversion into human agency through concretisation, rather than their 
naturalisation and objectification as external determinations. The gap between 
theory and history, widened through UCD’s recourse to general abstractions, turns 
into a hiatus. Dialectical concept-formation, in contrast, suggests the 
historicisation of the field of conceptuality. 
Historicising the Field of Conceptuality: The Case of Medieval Political 
Geography 
                                                          
111 Marx, op. cit. in note 88, p. 83. 
112 Ellen Wood, op. cit. in note 106,  p. 72. 
113 Ibid., p. 73. 
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How does the fallacy of concepts as general abstractions and the 
concomitant problems of reification, essentialism and ontologisation play out 
historically for UCD’s core categories of “the international” (and its disciplinary 
reflection in Geopolitics), “society” (Sociology) and “development” (History). 114 
The attempt to develop omnitemporal categories that apparently bring out 
commonalities across the record of human history do more to conceal rather than 
reveal – to obfuscate rather than specify. For the notion of UCD either fails to 
grasp from within its premises – beyond the vague proposition that unevenness 
itself fragments a primordial ur-society (hunter-gatherer) into multiple societies 
(sedentary agrarian), creating the inside/outside distinction – the historical 
alterations in the constitution of political geography and inter-polity relations (to 
the degree that they exist at all). Or it operates on the basis of a pre-conceived 
territorial matrix that happens to coincide with the modern inter-state system, 
premised on the formal political jurisdiction over contiguous and spatially 
delimited territories: multiple sovereignties. This international ontology model 
seems to be retrojected onto history at large, eliding the fact that neither polis-
federations, nor imperial, nor feudal, nor any other forms of political organisation 
were either organised along the idea of “the international” or the “intersocietal” – 
understood here as spatial co-existence, premised on mutually exclusive and fixed 
territoriality, or consciously conceived of their relations with each other as 
international relations. There may have been multiplicity of co-present 
communities throughout history, but no straight path leads from this numerical 
definition to a specification of their widely diverging political geographies, spatial 
practices and relations.  
At this stage, we should perhaps recall that one of the key theoretical 
debates in the “historical turn in IR” was precisely John Ruggie’s charge that Neo-
Realism contained no theoretical means to capture qualitative change (neither a 
dimension, nor a determinant of change), able to account for the very making of 
an interstate system predicated on an inside/outside distinction in marked contrast 
to the heterogeneity of “feudal actors” in medieval geopolitics. And this IR debate 
exemplarily illustrates the dangers in operating with a pre-conceived modernist 
conceptual idiom when thinking about geopolitical orders other than the modern 
                                                          
114 “A fourth set of puzzles arises from the historically constituted character not only of the state and the 
states system, but also of the categories in which we seek to understand the dynamics of contemporary 
world politics (…). It is tempting to minimize the significance of the historical experiences through which 
crucial concepts and ways of speaking have been formed. The longing for timeless categories has 
exercised a profound influence on many of those we associate with rationalism in the more philosophical 
sense of this term. Yet it is possible to trace the history of the terms “state”, “sovereignty”, “individual”, 
“culture”, “security” and many of the other terms now taken for granted. In doing so, it is possible to 
discover how they emerged in response to specific historical conjunctions and contradictions. Accounts of 
history as a sharp break between life before international relations and life since international relations 
detract attention from the historically specific meanings embodied in concepts and categories that can so 
easily appear to transcend historical contingency. The categories and concepts we have learnt to use 
with such facility, almost without thinking, come to appear natural and inevitable”. Their contested 
history is soon forgotten.’ Rob B.J. Walker, “History and Structure in the Theory of International 
Relations”, Millennium: Journal of International Studies (Vol. 18, No.2, 1989), pp. 172. 
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inter-state system. For Martin Wight concluded that “the word “international” is 
anachronistic when applied to the Middle Ages.”115 And sure enough, John Ruggie 
argued precisely the opposite: “This system of rule was inherently 
“international”.” 116 The confusion stems precisely from the conceptual rigidities 
that the anachronistic domestic/international IR binary imposes on any analysis of 
historical geopolitical orders which do not comply with this distinction and its 
sister-binary of anarchy/hierarchy. 
The medieval system of rule, as we now know in IR and as medievalists 
have emphasised for decades, was neither international (anarchic) nor domestic 
(hierarchical), but sui generis, and only intelligible in terms of its own social 
relations of lordship, requiring its own categories of analyses.117 As social relations 
in medieval Europe were configured in terms of semi-hierarchical relations of 
vassalage and personal dependence stretching out in chains of sub- and super-
infeudation among lords claiming conditional property over their dispersed 
lordships (conditional on the provision of military service and counsel), no 
conception and practice of unified and exclusive political territoriality amongst 
multiple sovereigns could emerge. Some rear-vassals held lands from different 
kingly overlords, and even the English King, for example, remained a vassal to the 
French King until the 15th Century. Since the means of violence were 
oligopolistically dispersed amongst multiple lords, informally held together in 
scalar and pyramidal chains of reciprocal loyalty (fealty), the geometric notion of 
“parcellised sovereignty” is as misleading as the theological notion of papal supra-
territoriality. Since there were no public states and no societies in medieval Europe 
and since no coherent and unambiguous “unit of analysis” could be specified, the 
notion of “inter” breaks down.118 Where is “the international” on the medieval 
map?119 
                                                          
115 Martin Wight, Systems of State (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1977), p. 130. 
116 Ruggies’s own exposition of medieval rule should have alerted him that the international/domestic 
binary is not apposite: ‘To begin with, the distinction between “internal” and “external” political realms, 
separated by clearly “demarcated “boundaries”, made little sense until late in the day. In addition, it was 
quite common for rulers in different territorial settings to be one another’s feoffor or feoffee for different 
regions of their respective lands. And the feudal ruling class was mobile in manner not dreamt of since – 
able to travel and assume governance from one end of the continent to the other without hesitation or 
difficulty, because’ – citing Perry Anderson – “public territories formed a continuum with private estates”. 
John Ruggie, ‘Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity: Toward a Neorealist Synthesis’, in 
Robert O. Keohane (ed.), Neorealism and its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), pp. 
142-143. 
117 See the references in footnote 37. 
118 There is an interesting subterranean intellectual line leading from the German conservative and partly 
fascist tradition, which insisted on “concrete concepts” in their critique of the universal and abstract 
categories of liberalism and the Enlightenment, to today’s Conceptual History (Begriffsgeschichte). This is 
exemplified by Otto Brunner in his attempt to retrieve a distinct medieval conception of German 
statehood in his own time (in contrast to the un-German concept of the liberal state), via Carl Schmitt’s 
notion of a historically concrete European inter-state “nomos” (in distinction to the spaceless liberal 
cosmos), to Reinhard Koselleck’s project of Conceptual History, which traces the changing semantic 
meanings of fundamental socio-political categories over time. In this tradition however, concrete 
concepts are, less so in Brunner but more so in Schmitt and Koselleck, methodologically dissociated from 
the social relations they were meant to capture. Conceptual History did thus not aim to provide a socio-
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Medieval territoriality was a distinct spatial praxis, grounded in distinct 
social relations, which nullified any conception of “the international”. UCD falls 
therefore into the same trap as had Wight and Ruggie: an inability to render the 
sui generis nature of medieval spatiality intelligible. And without a clearly 
identifiable “political unit”, multi-linearity disappears as a meaningful category 
before “lines” (borders) between entities were actually drawn. The thinnest of all 
abstractions - multiplicity – is unable to shed light on feudal geopolitical relations, 
which knew no distinction between an “inside” and an “outside” – the domestic 
and the international.120 For the fallacy of switching from the ontological singular 
to the ontological plural as a transhistorical constant resides precisely in the 
foreclosure of understanding socio-political environments which fall in neither 
category. If the international is defined generically and numerically in UCD as 
“more than one society”, then this indicates that UCD has never really mentally 
surmounted the “conflict-unit” ontology of Realism. It follows that UCD does not 
                                                                                                                                                     
political history of concept-formation, but remained trapped in the non-concrete, i.e. the de-sociologised 
but inter-textualised historicisation of conceptual semantics. Timo Pankakoski, “Conflict, Context, 
Concreteness: Koselleck and Schmitt on Concepts”, Political Theory (Vol. 38, No. 6, 2010), pp. 749-779. 
On Carl Schmitt’s concrete-order-thinking, see Benno Teschke, “Decisions and Indecisions: Political and 
Intellectual Receptions of Carl Schmitt”, New Left Review, 2nd series (No. 67, 2011), pp. 61-95; and “The 
Fetish of Geopolitics: A Reply to Gopal Balakrishnan”, New Left Review, 2nd series (No.69, 2011), pp. 81-
100. 
119 There is therefore no “conceptual shield” of the international that “historical sociological critiques of 
IR have challenged but failed to penetrate theoretically.” Matin, op.cit. in note 60, p. 11. Rather, any 
theoretical penetration of this transhistorical illusory shield becomes a-historical. In other words, UCD 
takes Neo-Realism too seriously. 
120 Matin provides evidence for the vacuity of “the international” in the context of feudal social property 
relations in his critique of Brenner’s and the author’s account of the rise of capitalism in England, 
objecting that it was driven by the international dimensions of the English experience. Matin, ibid., p. 53. 
Feudal spatial practices are misread as international determinations in alignment with UCD’s colour-
blindness to medieval pre-international spatiality. Operating with an ontological and transhistorical 
conception of the international, every spatial practice turns monochromatically into a validation of UCD. 
Furthermore, these antecedent “international” determinations – from the 11th Century Frankish outward 
movements into the extra-Frankish European periphery (including the Norman Conquest and the 
Ostsiedlung) to the Flemish export markets for wool – where system-wide presences and structural 
opportunities, available to all European regions. However, if these “international dimensions” were 
causally determinative for the origins of capitalism in England, then why did a capitalist transformation 
occur only there, and not in East-Elbia, Reconquista Spain, Norman Sicily or in France? In other words, 
UCD relies on the fact that explanation equals the incremental and long-range accumulation of prior 
external and internal causes (which apparently reach at some unspecified point in time critical mass and 
flip over into outcomes), without clarifying why similar causal contexts led to radically different outcomes 
in different regions of Europe. This is why the “endogenous” emphasis on the specificities of class 
conflict in England, in combination with a comparative cross-case account, which clarifies the differential 
resolution of similar structural preconditions, remains such a powerful analytical device in PM. It also 
clarifies why the structuralist lense of UCD remains an impotent strategy, as it either theoretically 
expunges the relevance of class struggle (agency) or reduces it to a consequence of prior 
determinations. UCD’s international correction to the Brenner Thesis relapses therefore into the same 
type of error committed by Brenner’s original structuralist interlocutors, as the Neo-Malthusians and the 
Neo-Smithians were at a loss to explain why similar demographic and commercial imperatives led to such 
diverging results in England, France, and East-Elbia. It was because they, like UCD, evacuate class 
conflict from their premises. 
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transcend the international/domestic binary. It rather reproduces and entrenches 
its prominence by falsely re-inscribing it into world history at large. 
And it was this historically specific question – how to conceptualise and 
historicise the medieval-to-modern transition not in space/time-indifferent, but in 
space/time-specific social relations? - which Hannes Lacher and the author tried to 
resolve on reformulated Marxist premises, drawing on the early work of Robert 
Brenner and Ellen Wood on the “Transition Debate”. 121  We argued that this 
transition was the outcome of specific historically situated struggles between 
specific socio-political agents, grounded in specific politically-constituted social 
property relations – a switch from mainstream IR’s and orthodox Marxism’s 
universals to historical praxis. Rather than deriving the inter-state system from 
capitalism or positing it as an abstract a priori, we suggested that this problem 
could only be addressed in a historical and processual perspective. For inter-
stateness was an emergent result (a “spatial practice”) of pre-capitalist inter-lordly 
and lord-peasant conflicts over land and labour in a pre-territorialised context, 
stretching back to the dissolution of the Carolingian Empire around the 
millennium.122 This was a process driven by the spatial practices of lordly and 
dynastic geopolitical accumulation – simultaneously a process of institutional 
state-formation and spatial state-differentiation - whereby feudal de-centralised 
and territorially non-exclusive lordly monarchies came to disentangle themselves 
from each other over time to form territorially exclusive and institutionally 
centralised sovereignties. This procedure does not presuppose the “international” 
as given and as the point of departure, or understand geopolitical orders as 
reflections of “modes of production”, but historicises the temporal inside/outside 
differentiation in the passage from feudal non-territorialised social relations to 
“absolutist” territorialized social relations. This generates an account of the social 
construction and constitution of a recognisable (though territorially still imperfect) 
early modern inter-state system, revolving henceforth predominantly around 
dynastic claims to sovereignty. And while this revised the mainstream IR thesis of 
the Westphalian Peace Treaties as the codification of modern statehood, 
sovereignty, and the modern inter-state system (since pre-capitalist state 
territoriality remained the patrimony of the king), the analysis also suggested that 
it was not capitalism, which had created the inter-state system, but rather that 
the non-capitalist social praxes of inter-dynasticism had constructed a multi-
territorial carapace – a geopolitical pluriverse - within which capitalism 
subsequently emerged. 123  Here, in contrast to Tilly and UCD, the inter-state 
                                                          
121 Robert Brenner, op. cit. in note 98; Ellen Wood, op. cit. in note 106. 
122 Teschke, op. cit. in note 17; Lacher, op. cit. in note 17. It is thus misleading to discount the author’s 
work as “proto-Realist” and “limited to illuminating the changing historical forms of the international – 
leaving the analytically prior existence of the phenomenon itself un-theorized.” Rosenberg, op. cit. in 
note 52, p. 337. There cannot be any analytically prior existence of the international outside concrete 
historical manifestations of political geography, as in the medieval order. 
123  And this territorial pluriverse has to be conceived not as an invariant structural presence – the 
geopolitical form of capitalism - but as subject to diverse strategies of territorialisation: “The most 
cursory glance at the history of international relations reveals a wide gamut of different configurations 
between territoriality ad capitalist states. From the establishment of the  liberal trade system of the Pax 
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system appears as an historical outcome and not as a generic starting-point.
124
 
But unless we understand the specific non-international nature of the medieval 
world, we simply cannot invoke the distinction between inside and outside, and 
operate ex ante with the method of methodological internationalism. That 
opposition was not yet available. 
This, then, was neither an inside-out, nor an outside-in explanation, nor 
an ex post factum re-attachment of Geopolitics to Sociology (or vice-versa), nor 
an account of the empirical interplay between two pre-constituted dimensions of 
reality (society and the inter-state system), for none of these distinctions were yet 
available. Critiques along these lines reveal precisely the conceptual hold 
exercised by a modernist vocabulary on the collective IR imagination, hard-wired 
into the minds of its practitioners. It was rather a novel Marxist socio-historical 
interpretation of qualitative change – spatial and social. It showed the temporally 
consecutive dual differentiation between an inside from an outside (achieved 
during the early modern Absolutist period), within which a second differentiation 
between the political from the social (state and society) in the context of the rise 
and consolidation of capitalism occurred in spatio-temporally distinctive and 
geopolitically inter-active ways. And only this double differentiation – spatial 
(outside/inside) and socio-political (above/below) - constituted the very distinction 
between multiple state-societies in form of the inter-state system, whose 
interactions came to be expressed in distinct international relations between 
sovereign states. And this very spatial and socio-political re-configuration came to 
be intellectually captured by the fragmentation of the pan-European pre-
disciplinary catholic and scholastic cosmos in terms of the very disciplinary 
bifurcation between Sociology and Politics (and, later, IR) – the reconfiguration of 
the field of disciplinarity. 
Certainly, if we take as self-evident that this inside/outside differentiation 
is transhistorical (which it is not), that Sociology and Politics/IR should have 
reflected and overcome this inside/outside differentiation all along (which they 
                                                                                                                                                     
Britannica and the “New Imperialism” of Salisbury and Chamberlain, with its oscillation between “formal” 
and “informal” empire, via the territrially expansive and economically autarchic Lebensraum conceptions 
of German Geopolitik and the Japanese project of a “Greater East-Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere”, to the 
US-sponsored (but multilateral) postwar liberal world order and contemporary European integration; the 
historical record exhibits an immense co-variation in the nexus between capitalist states and projects of 
territorialization. To negate these historical fluctuations, as aberrations from a ‘normal’ correlation 
between capitalism and the classical states-system, would be to reify a structuralist view of an essentially 
invariant international order. The reality is that capitalist states have adopted different “strategies of 
territorialisation”, ranging from the grant of full juridical independence to subaltern states, via semi-
hegemonic projects like the EU, to systems of outright territorial control in the pursuit of Lebensraum or 
“formal empire”. What an understanding of these diverse strategies of spatialisation requires is an 
agency-centred perspective that emphasises the variable politics of territorialisation, rather than a logic 
of empire or a logic of capital”. Benno Teschke, “Imperial Doxa from the Berlin Republic”, New Left 
Review, 2nd series (No. 40, 2006) p. 136. 
124 Clemens Hoffmann, “The Balkanization of Ottoman Rule: Premodern Origins of the Modern 
International System in Southeastern Europe”, Cooperation & Conflict (Vol. 43, No. 4, 2008),  pp. 373-
396. 
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could not), and that theorisation in IR and IHS equals trans-historic generalisation 
and causal explanation (which it does not), then all cows appear to be grey in the 
dark night of positivism and we are returned to the sterile mantra sermonised by 
(Neo-)Realism that the international is the international is the international – 
always already there, except that UCD has now provided a “sociological” definition 
of it! But if we define theorisation and concept-formation as a process of historical 
specification, anchored in contested social relations, then we can start not to trace 
the historical forms of “the international” as a transhistorical given, but specify the 
agential construction of the rich variety of political geographies, the modalities of 
geopolitical relations, and the strategies of territorialisation across time and space 
as concrete phenomena without relapsing into essentialised sociologisms. And as 
Neo-Realism has no determinant or dimension of systemic change, so is UCD by 
definition barred, as we established earlier, to explain the medieval-to-modern 
transition or any other “systemic” transformation. 
In short: To suppose a generic world-historical inside/outside distinction – 
“co-existence” - as the pre-constituted spatial matrix for the operationalization of 
the law of UCD seems curiously ahistorical. In fact, positing the disjuncture 
between the outside and the inside – allegedly reflected in the dichotomous 
disciplines of Sociology and Geopolitics, the “classical lacuna” - as the starting-
point for IHS takes for granted what requires explanation: namely the historical 
process whereby one country came to be differentiated from another, constituting 
the very separation between the domestic and the international. For only this 
making of an interstate system - generating simultaneously two separate modes 
of reflection on this condition, respectively institutionalised in the disciplines of 
Sociology and Politics/IR - constructs a potential dualism between two disjointed 
fields of inquiry. 
“The international” – if by that we mean any specific geopolitical order, 
like the inter-state order – is itself an explanandum (rather than being a 
metaphysical expression of uneven development) and should not be abstracted 
out as a general ontology and handed over to Realism’s raison d’être that justifies 
Realism’s standing as a theory of IR. For Realism and Neo-Realism always posited 
international anarchy as a factum brutum – an autonomous and constant 
dimension of reality subject to its own logics and laws - and never provided socio-
historical accounts of geopolitical orders. This suggests that while UCD has 
usefully highlighted the problem of classical sociology’s singular ontology – to 
conceive of social theory as concerned with the internal reconstruction of societal 
development – there is an unrecognised danger of de-historicising and 
reproducing this ontology (society as a unit of analysis) by merely pluralizing it – a 
switch from methodological nationalism to an a priori methodological 
internationalism. For this procedure leaves the idea of co-existing societies as 
ontological forms intact, even when their development is co-constituted by “the 
international”. For what is ultimately needed is a radical historicisation of all 
ontologies, rather than the speculative ontologisation of history in terms of the 
universal multiplication of “societies”, “development”, and “the international” ab 
initio. 
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Why should there be IR/IHS Theory? Historicising the Field of 
Disciplinarity 
In this sense, rather than demonstrating surprise that nobody seems to 
have answered Martin Wight’s rhetorical question “Why is there no IR Theory?”, 
we should perhaps desist from insinuating that the political theorists of the 
classical canon were somehow mentally disabled and rather recognise the 
contextual fact that they faced historically very different geopolitical environments 
and therefore different sets of intellectual questions, which did not correspond to 
the modern condition of the interstate system.125 If this holds then the question 
“Why is there no International Historical Sociology?” is equally misleading. If 
neither “society”, “the international”, and “development” are natural and universal 
phenomena, then neither Sociology/Economics, Politics/IR, and History are natural 
and universal disciplines present to scholars since time immemorial (even though 
the question holds for the classical sociological tradition), which require absorption 
into a universal IHS.  
Why, for example, should political philosophers in classical Rome ponder 
the puzzle of IR Theory, when their “world” was constituted by one Imperium 
Romanum during the Pax Romana, whose universal domination (imperium sine 
fine) was taken for granted and whose political geography was constituted by 
conceptual and territorial distinctions revolving around Roman citizenship, 
centrally administered provinces, and surrounding tributary areas, outside distinct 
conceptions of frontiers (limites) and borders (fines)? Why should medieval 
scholastic scholars, prior to the Discoveries and only interrupted by the Crusades, 
preoccupy themselves with IR, when their “world” was constituted by one 
respublica Christiana, which integrated the “known” Catholic world and its various 
intermediate powers hierarchically under the spiritual and worldly authority of the 
Curia and the papal mandate? Casting our eyes further afield, why should the 
Confucian literati of the Chinese imperial court bureaucracy, who conceived the 
discourse of the celestial imperial mandate (tianming) for the emperor to control 
the realm (tong) and to govern in harmony (zheng) within the wider imperial 
tribute system in East Asia, develop either a conception of inter-national theory or 
inter-national historical sociology? Each “world” has to be conceptualised as a sui 
generis case of political spatiality allergic to universal categorisation. And this 
                                                          
125 Martin Wight, “Why is there no International Theory?”, in Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight (eds.) 
Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International Politics (London: Allen & Unwin 1966), 
pp. 17-34. Wight seems to have four different answers. First, as “international politics is the realm of 
recurrence and repetition” in which “political action is most regularly necessitous”, international theory 
shrinks by default to the writings of Realists. Second, as modern theorists write primarily as citizens from 
within their states, their allegiance to the state “has absorbed almost all the intellectual energy devoted 
to political study”. Third, the modern and liberal belief in “progress” over-optimistically dissolved the 
persistence of international concerns. Fourth, “international theory, or what there is of it, is scattered, 
unsystematic, and mostly inaccessible to the layman. Moreover, it is largely repellent and intractable in 
form”. 
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holds even if all these “worlds” are inserted into a wider political geography, which 
requires its own historical conceptualisation.  
Inversely, intellectual reflections by contemporaries on the problem of 
geo-political co-existence and co-constitution – anarchy rather than hierarchy in 
IR parlance - only became acute political preoccupations if and when imperial 
political geographies and cosmological conceptions of world order where under 
threat, as during the classical Greek polis-system, the Renaissance city-states 
system and, finally, during the rise of the “Westphalian” inter-dynastic order, 
premised on new conceptions and legitimations of absolute sovereignty and the 
demise of both, lordly chains of personal relations and supra-regional and pan-
European papal authority. These specific geo-political conjunctures generated 
flourishing discourses on diplomacy, statecraft and inter-polity relations, which 
were subsequently mobilised by IR Realism as vindications of their timeless 
theoretical pronunciamentos. After all, semantic history teaches us that the term 
“international” – not substantivised but as an adjective - first gained currency with 
Jeremy Bentham in 1789 to distinguish the supra-“national” category of “the law 
of nations” (the ius gentium which is more adequately translated as the law of 
peoples) – which Bentham deemed to be too close to the idea of domestic and 
municipal law – from “inter-national law” (ius inter gentes), i.e. that new body of 
law that came to govern specifically relations between sovereign political 
entities.126 Here, a conceptual neologism came to capture an altered situation. 
What this suggests is that the changing practices of political geography have to be 
conceptually historicised, rather than to passively fall back on apparently secure 
and pre-constituted societies as units of analysis, which always presuppose an 
“inter” at the obfuscatory level of the general abstraction.127 
                                                          
126 “The word international, it must be acknowledged, is a new one; though, it is hoped, sufficiently 
analogous and intelligible. It is calculated to express, in a more significant way, the branch of law which 
goes commonly under the name of the law of nations: an appellation so uncharacteristic, that, were it 
not for the force of custom, it would seem rather to refer to internal jurisprudence”. Jeremy Bentham, An 
Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (Oxford: Clarendon Press [1780/89] 1907), p. 
114. 
127 The recovery of the self-understandings of historically situated agents, pursued through the retrieval 
of past semantics in Conceptual History, is therefore useful as an essential hermeneutic step, but not 
sociologically exhaustive, as the acceptance of the historicity of concepts in terms of the self-descriptions 
of contemporaries cannot be taken at face value. We do not need to subscribe to the methodological 
protocols of Conceptual History as an approach to History, which rests largely on textuality and inter-
textuality, to recognise its crucial insight that concept-formation is always a contextual affair, bound to 
“concrete” socio-political questions, experiences and conflicts. Rather than imputing static and “once-
and-for-all’ definitions to concepts, it insists on the temporalisation of the semantic meanings of socio-
political concepts over time and space as “concepts of movement” (Bewegungsbegriffe). Reinhard 
Koselleck, ‘Einleitung’, in Otto Brunner, Werner Conze and Reinhard Koselleck, Geschichtliche 
Grundbegriffe: Historisches Lexikon zur Politisch-Sozialen Sprache in Deutschland, Vol. 1 (Stuttgart; Ernst 
Klett Verlag, 1972), pp. XIII-XXVII; Reinhard Koselleck “Social History and Conceptual History”, in 
Koselleck, The Practice of Conceptual History: Timing History, Spacing Concepts (Stanford, Cal.: Stanford 
University Press, 2002), pp. 20-37. For a general introduction see Melvin Richter, The History of Political 
and Social Concepts: A Critical Introduction (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995). For a recent 
survey, see Willibald Steinmetz, “40 Jahre Begriffsgeschichte – The State of the Art”, in Heidrun Kämper 
and Ludwig M. Eichinger (eds.), Sprache – Kognition – Kultur (Berlin: Walter de Gruyer, 2008), pp. 174-
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And only this rise of the inter-state order forms the very condition of 
possibility for the disciplinary disjunctures between sociology/political economy 
and politics/geopolitics to arise. In other words, pre-modern social and political 
thought could not bridge the “classical lacuna” between outside and inside 
because this specific differentiation had not yet emerged historically as a pressing 
and visible phenomenon. Martin Wight’s lament on the parerga of international 
thought – those accessory afterthoughts and miscellaneae outside the central 
intellectual task of reflecting on the “good life” within a polity – does therefore not 
indict the poverty of the classical canon of political theory, but rather indicates the 
widespread absence of “inter-national” concerns in pre-interstate orders before 
they became manifest as pressing empirical referents. In this sense, the lament 
reveals Wight’s inattention to history. 
Let us pursue this line of thought – the historicisiation of concepts in 
conjunction with the disciplinary fragmentation and professionalisation of the 
humanities in conjunction with the historicisation of the fragmentation of the 
European “world” – a bit further. For the historicisation of the conceptual field also 
engenders the historicisation of the field of disciplinarity. Above discussion 
problematises the internal/external distinction in pre-international geopolitical 
orders as a meaningful and self-evident spatial binary, translating into its 
categorical non-distinction in classical political theory and disabling the rise of the 
notion of “the international” and the sister-discipline of IR. We now have to reflect 
on the historical rise of sociology, political economy, politics 
(Staatswissenschaften), and history as separate disciplines – and their referents: 
society, the market, the state and historicity. For their quadruple emergence was 
intimately tied to the spatial inside/outside distinction predicated on the formation 
of the inter-state system. But to this distinction, we will need to add two 
additional distinctions: first, the vertical distinction between the political and the 
social/economic, conceiving of the social (“civil society”), economic (“the market”) 
and the political (“the state”) as potentially autonomous spheres of reality; second, 
the temporal distinction between non-development and development, registered 
in yet another disciplinary re-constitution: historiography’s new conception of 
historical time. 
                                                                                                                                                     
197. The absence of a separate entry in the lexicon (and in the register) on the concept of ‘the 
international’ – in contradistinction to the terms “Internationale’” (as in the First International), 
“internationalisation”, “internationalisms”, and “internationality” as distinct modern concepts, is indicative 
of the absence of its empirical referent as a general historical phenomenon. In contrast, terms like 
“Europäisches Völkersystem”,  “Völkerrecht”, “Völkergemeinschaft”, “Staatengesellschaf”’, and 
“Mächtesystem” appear in the register as “concrete” and historically time-bound concepts of early 
modernity. Ultimately, however, Conceptual History cannot render an exhaustive grasp of history, since it 
remains limited to a reconstruction of history in terms of the conceptual (and primarily elitist) self-
understandings of contemporaries. To the degree that Conceptual History recognises that concepts are 
political concepts, designed not only to represent but also to intervene into reality in purposive and thus 
reality-forming ways, they lose their ability to operate as categories of analysis and become themselves 
the objects of critical investigation. 
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The constitution of sociology and political economy as independent, if pre-
disciplinary, fields in the 18th Century and, subsequently, as self-conscious and 
institutionalised disciplines in the 19th Century, was built as a reaction to the ur-
problematic of a recursive and static tradition versus a progressing and dynamic 
modernity. 128  The intellectual challenge and world-historical novum was to 
supersede cyclical conceptions of time with linear, progressive and, ultimately, 
teleological conceptions of time, culminating in the very modernist idea of the 
temporal directionality of history. This was captured in the widespread acceptance 
of evolutionary, stadial or stagist conceptions of history in Classical Sociology and 
Classical Political Economy. In short, the transition from tradition to modernity, 
feudal to commercial society, Gemeinschaft (community) to Gesellschaft (society), 
or agrarian to industrial society – plus the acceleration and directionality of 
historical time manifest in these transitions – constituted “society” and “economy” 
as new and potentially independent objects of inquiry, reflected in sociology and 
political economy.129 In the process, these disciplines became separated out from 
historiography (and theology), which re-founded itself by discovering the very 
notion of the historicity of a secularised conception of history (its irreversibility), 
which was now super-charged with notions of progress, development and 
teleology.130 Not only spatiality, but also temporality has its very own historicity. 
The notion of “development” reflects a historically distinct experience, different 
from non-development, de-development, under-development and millennial stasis. 
Cyclical (life-cycles of civilisations), religious (eschatological), and metaphysical 
(the self-unfolding of the divine spirit) conceptions of history became widely, 
though not universally, replaced by secular and teleological conceptions of history 
in Western Europe. 
This, analogous to the ontologised notions of the international and society, 
speaks to the historically unsecured status of the abstract category of 
development. For development as Reinhard Koselleck et al. suggest is, again, a 
historically specific category, tightly linked to a notion of progress which was born 
– semantically – in the context of specifically liberal conceptions of history. And 
both were tied, even if unwittingly, to the rise of capitalism. And the specificity of 
liberal-stadial and secular conceptions of history as relying on historically 
ascending stages of development implied the rejection of prevailing cyclical 
                                                          
128 For sociologies of the history of sociology and social theory and their objects of analyses, see Wolf 
Lepenies (ed.), Geschichte der Soziologie: Studien zur Kognitiven, Sozialen und Historischen Identität 
einer Disziplin, 4 vols. (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1981);  Philip Abrams, “The Sense of the Past and 
the Origins of Sociology”, Past and Present (No. 55, 1972), pp. 18-32; Johan Heilbron, The Rise of Social 
Theory (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995); Peter Wagner, A History and Theory of the 
Social Sciences: Not All that is Solid Melts into Air (London: Sage Publications, 2001). 
129 On the concept of “society”, see Manfred Riedel, “Bürgerliche Gesellschaft” and “Gesellschaft, 
Gemeinschaft”, in Otto Brunner, Werner Conze and Reinhart Koselleck (eds.), Geschichtliche 
Grundbegriffe: Historisches Lexikon zur Politisch-Sozialen Sprache in Deutschland, vol. 2 (Stuttgart: Ernst 
Klett Verlag, 1975), respectively pp. 719-800 and pp. 801-862; David McNally, Political Economy and the 
Rise of Capitalism: A Reinterpretation (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1988). 
130 Reinhart Koselleck, „Fortschritt“; Wolfgang Wieland, „Entwicklung, Evolution“; Reinhart Koselleck 
„Geschichte, Historie“, in Brunner, Conze and Koselleck (eds.), op. cit. in note 129, respectively pp. 351-
423, pp. 199-228, pp. 593-717. 
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(astronomical) conceptions of history, which conceived of history as the eternal 
return of the same – pitching the static-recursive against the dynamic-teleological. 
In which sense, then, is development a transhistorical category? In which sense 
can it be dissociated from the liberal-Marxist re-periodisation of history and 
inflated to world-historical proportions - not to speak of phases of de-development 
and the disadvantages of backwardness even within capitalism? 
To render the concept of development compliant with the claim of its 
transhistoricity, UCD has therefore to undertake a conceptual volte-face by 
retracting from an earlier commitment to capitalism as a historically specific 
relation of production – theorised at the time with reference to Robert Brenner 
and Ellen Wood as originating in 16th Century England – and by embracing a Neo-
Smithian conception of development, now re-grounded in a transhistoricised and 
quantitative widening of the division of labour, driving social differentiation.
131
 To 
secure this re-conceptualisation, Karl Marx’s German Ideology (rather than Das 
Kapital) is invoked without acknowledging the philologically and exegetically 
important argument that this early conception was still influenced by liberalism 
and classical political economy and later rejected by Marx himself.
132
 This aligns 
UCD with a bourgeois and liberal conception of development. 
The meaning of these concepts – society, economy, state, development, 
and history – underwent thus a fundamental semantic re-definition within a 
fundamentally reconstituted field of disciplinarity as distinctly early modern socio-
political categories. And this is why most, if not all, classical socio-political 
concepts radically changed their semantic meanings (or were invented ab ovo) in 
Europe around that period – the “saddle time” of the turn from the 18th to the 19th 
Century – which serves as the organising chronological divide, surely temporally 
uneven, in Koselleck’s 8-volume lexicon of fundamental socio-political concepts. As 
the notion of the inter-state system is a historically specific category, so is the 
notion of “society” in that historically specific sense of a “civil society” encased in 
but abstracted from the political – i.e. the state, which is itself the precondition for 
the inter-state order. And so are the concepts of development, progress, and 
historicity. 
And it is only here at that historical moment in time when society and 
economy become distinct objects of study – separate both from the state and 
other societies – and as the idea (however dimly grasped) spread that the locus of 
                                                          
131 Rosenberg, op. cit. in note 17; Rosenberg, op. cit. in note 58, p. 179. 
132 Robert Brenner, “Bourgeois Revolution and Transition to Capitalism”, in A. L. Beier, David Cannadine, 
James Rosenheim (eds.), The First Modern Society: Essays in English History in Honour of Lawrence 
Stone (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989),  pp. 271-304. In a chapter entitled the 
“development of the concept of development”, Norbert Elias notes that “even the most highly educated 
and learned of men in those days (two hundred and fifty or three hundred years ago) were unable to 
grasp intellectually the conception of “development” that is nowadays taken for granted”. Norbert Elias, 
What is Sociology?  (Dublin: University College Dublin Press, 2012 [1970]), p. 143. Elias also historicises 
the concept of society, ibid., pp. 201-213. 
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change and the acceleration of time are somehow grounded in secular socio-
economic dynamics (rather than governed by metaphysics or theology), that 
separate branches of knowledge, namely sociology, political economy, and politics 
emerge as reflections upon but also as legitimising discourses for these new social 
phenomena – society, economy, state. Simultaneously, as a non-territorialised 
notion of the field of the social (Respublica Christiana, Europe, empire) became 
increasingly caged and contained in multiple states in a two-step process – first as 
absolutist Old Regimes in the 17th Century and then as nation-states in the course 
of the late 18th and 19th Centuries – the object of study for the new science of 
politics became the centralised state as a new modality of public power over a 
contiguous territory, encapsulated in the notion of sovereignty. And it is only then, 
once the co-ordinates of a politically and temporally refracted Europe as a 
geopolitical pluriverse subject to the differential and uneven rhythms of 
development became dramatically visible to contemporaries, that a process of – 
intra-European and inter-civilisational – comparison, arguably first grasped in 
Friedrich Schlegel’s idea of the contemporaneity of the non-contemporaneous, 
generated the binary vocabulary of advance and backwardness to capture the 
differential temporalities and trajectories of nation-states. 133  This process of 
comparison, first more intuitively grasped by Schlegel but already systematically 
alive from the Physiocrats to Listian national political economy, generated finally 
the sub-fields of comparative historical sociology and comparative political 
economy.134 The former was influentially expressed in Otto Hintze’s comparative 
studies on constitutional history and in Max Weber’s sociology of religion, which 
sought to define the developmental blockages of non-European civilisations in 
terms of the economic ethics of the world religions.135 The latter emerged as the 
                                                          
133 See Robbie Shilliam, German Thought and International Relations: The Rise and Fall of a Liberal 
Project (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009). It should be noted that the construction of a historical 
sociology of political and international thought captured in the category of a “consciousness of 
backwardness” in terms of (or as a function of) advanced and backward development will run up against 
the “anomalies” that, at least in 19th Century Prussia-Germany (but also in Italy), the notions of 
backwardness and catch-up were not unanimously accepted. In fact, the dominant paradigm in 
historiography – historicism, best exemplified by Leopold von Ranke – rejected any normative act of 
comparison and depreciatory value-judgment on Germany’s position over and against the Western 
powers. By insisting on historical individuality, historicism rather suggested that every “epoch is 
immediate or equidistant to God” (“unmittelbar zu Gott”). Similarly, following in the tracks of the heroic 
history of the Prussian state as praised in Borussian historiography, “in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries a number of German historians were convinced that the German path to modernity 
was superior to the routes taken by their western European neighbours”. John Brewer and Eckhart 
Hellmuth, “Introduction: Rethinking Leviathan”, in Brewer and Hellmuth (eds.), Rethinking Leviathan: 
The Eighteenth-Century State in Britain and Germany (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 7. İn 
other words, no straight line leads from the international dimension of knowledge-production to a 
specification of the diversity of thought in particular national contexts. 
134 Milonakis and Fine, op. cit. in note 70; Jomo K.S. and Erik S. Reinert (eds.), The Origins of 
Development Economics: How Schools of Economic Thought Have Addressed Development (London: Zed 
Books, 2005); Kruse, op. cit. in note 70. 
135 Otto Hintze’s work moves, at times, from a comparative to an international perspective (even if this is 
not self-consciously formalised as a law-like IHS), as one of his key premises suggests the reconstruction 
of state-formations and constitutional developments in relation to international pressures, mainly 
mediated by war. Otto Hintze, Staat und Verfassung: Gesammelte Abhandlungen zur Allgemeinen 
Verfassungsgeschichte, 3rd edition (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1970). 
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tendentially cosmopolitan assumptions of classical political economy hit the reality 
of political power encased in differentially developing and separate nation-states. 
Classical political economy segmented into comparative political economy as 
“development economics”, spectrally refracted in various European countries. This 
resulted in disciplinary and intellectual regional specificities, as the German 
Historical School of national political economy, premised on the historical and 
inductive method, was in turn challenged by the a-historical theoretical economics 
of the Austrian School, relying upon abstract deductions, in the Methodenstreit. 
And it took the insight of Leon Trotsky to add to the comparative 
perspective, which contrasted differences and similarities between nation-states in 
non-relational ways over time, an international and thus relational perspective, by 
moving from the act of comparison and the method of comparative HS to the 
formalisation of temporally sequenced international inter-action by adding the 
adjective “combined” to his notion of uneven development.136 While this was an 
innovation of significant importance, he hypostasised – as all modern thinkers had 
done before and all contemporary Neo-Trotskyite IR theorists after him - the very 
presence of the interstate system as a pre-given. For rather than having provided 
a historical explanation or a theoretical derivation of the European inter-state 
system, they reasoned, like Trotsky and like Waltz, from the fact of its aprioristic 
existence. And this left unaddressed the question across what kind of geopolitical 
matrix the process of UCD unfolded as its political-geographical presupposition. 
The result of this hypostatisation was the super-imposition of an inter-societal 
perspective upon an un-theorised constitutive geopolitical geography, which, if the 
problem was seen at all, had to be imported as an “item on loan” from 
somewhere else, or spirited away into the supra-historical category of the 
international. Trotsky deployed therefore - and his present-day followers passively 
rely on - a theory of inter-societal relations without a conception of the inter-state 
system, leaving the historically prior existence of the phenomenon itself un-
theorized.
137
 Consequently, a void opens up which keeps UCD suspended in mid-
air. Why are there many states? 
The conclusion of this disciplinary sketch – the historicisation of the field 
of disciplinarity - suggests not only that Martin Wight’s question was wrongly 
posed, but to further suggest that its re-articulation – “Why is there no 
                                                          
136 The author used therefore Trotsky’s notion in previous work (Teschke, op.cit. in note 56) as a 
heuristic device or “theorem” for a specific period (from the 17th Century onwards), but not as a 
universal IR theory. And in this sense, UCD remains useful in generating conjectures and expectations, 
which (even though they cannot be answered from within its own premises) may be validated or refuted 
in open-ended historical research, but not as a positive and space-time indiscriminate law of world 
history, which self-validates through confirmationism. 
137 The rejection of Theda Skocpol’s conceptualisation of the international as an un-theorised “external 
trigger” of social revolutions is therefore hard to accept, if it is meant to be replaced with a space/time 
indifferent, de-substantualised and quantitative definition of the international as more than one society. 
For without a historical and substantive explanation of  inter-state system, how does UCD improve on 
Skocpol’s Neo-Weberian conception of the inter-stateness as a given? Matin, op. cit. in note 60, p. 8. 
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International Historical Sociology?” – cannot be addressed to an imaginary 
audience sitting in a space-time vacuum, holding a sub-optimal trans-historical 
dialogue on the perennial problems of IR Theory or IHS. Any answer requires 
itself a historical sociology of knowledge to ascertain the historical conditions of 
possibility for the very question of IHS to crystallize. The production of the 
conception of UCD has its own historicity. And this compresses and restricts, by 
the same token, the applicability of any method in IHS to a very distinct period in 
time in which “society”, “the inter-state pluriverse”, and “uneven development” 
had become meaningful categories and phenomena. The reverse procedure, 
abstracting out a universal method from this distinctive historical and geopolitical 
conjuncture as a general framework of analysis, leads astray. 
In other words, rather than wondering why nobody ever conceived of 
UCD as the adequate idiom of IHS as the solution to the riddle of world-history – 
and thus retrofitting a historically specific configuration onto history predicated on 
the ontologisation of the international/domestic and geopolitics/sociology 
distinctions, temporally super-charged with a universal notion of uneven 
development - we should perhaps start by noting that all three – the spatio-
temporally specific configuration of the internal/external dualism and its 
disciplinary reflection in Sociology and Politics/IR, and the acceleration of time 
captured in the concepts of History as progress/development – are concrete and 
time-bound phenomena not subject to transhistorical generalisations, not even at 
the highest level of abstractions. And only once this triple differentiation between 
outside from the inside (and IR from Sociology), above from below (and Politics 
from Economics), and cyclical recurrence from progressive time (and non-
Development from Development) had been established, can it make sense to 
speculate about the contours of an IHS, whether in the form of a positivist theory 
of UCD or its non-positivistic alternatives. In this sense, UCD does not only fail to 
overcome the outside/inside, geopolitics/sociology, and development/non-
development distinctions, it rather posits, entrenches, and reifies all three as 
universal ontologies present since the dawn of time. Yet, when UCD accuses the 
classical and contemporary canon of historical sociologists and IR theorists of 
having “no general theory”, Thompson’s reply to Althusser remains suggestive. 
For he objected that these critics “should reflect that what they take to be 
innocence or lethargy may be explicit and self-conscious refusal: a refusal of static 
analytic concepts, of a logic inappropriate to history” – a refusal to propagate 
universal, general, and causal laws of history, predicated on universalised 
ontologies.138 
UCD as a self-declared Marxist theory of IR, designed to replace 
mainstream IR theories and comparative HS through their sublation into the new 
paradigm of IHS has in the final analysis been corrupted by conducting the 
exercise largely on the intellectual terrain pre-defined by Neo-Realism’s positivistic 
and scientistic standard of theory-construction. This yields nomological-deductive 
covering laws. It implies the acceptance of Waltz’s definition of social science and 
                                                          
138 Thompson, op.cit. in note 93, pp. 230-231. 
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his conception of the structure and purpose of theory, leading to the progressive 
transformation of central historical Marxist categories of analysis into space-time 
indifferent universal abstractions. This reproduces Neo-Realism’s claims to 
transhistorical generality, its excising of agency as a category of analysis, the 
disrespect for the historical method as a standard of validation and falsification 
and its exclusion from UCD’s methodological protocols, the subordination of 
history to the drum-beat of a pre-conceived theory, the anachronistic projection of 
general categories of analysis over differently configured “worlds”, and the 
conversion of theory as critique into an affirmation of the international as an 
insuperable objectification of world history. In the process, it turns out that UCD 
fails to comply with Waltz’s theory/law distinction, remains circular and 
tautological, cannot account for change as development is axiomatically 
dissociated from human practice, and conveniently by-passes empirical counter-
evidence. It fails to overcome and historicise the domestic/international binary by 
transhistoricising the distinction through complementing “methodological 
nationalism” with a timeless “methodological internationalism”, ontologises history 
(rather than historicises ontologies) in terms of the general categories of the 
international, society and development, and remains blind to the lack of a concept 
of the inter-state order in Trotsky’s own deployment of UCD. In the attempt to 
“get behind” (Neo-)Realism and to slay the dragon of the “Realist moment” by 
incorporating the international into a sociological definition of IHS, UCD 
reproduces the theoretical baggage for which a superannuated Neo-Realism has 
been rightly lambasted for decades: positivism, transhistoricity, self-validation, 
abstraction, structuralism, and affirmation. The suggestion, shared by Neo-
Realism and UCD alike, that the entire course of human history can be captured 
by and subsumed under a single and parsimonious covering law, a universal 
passe-partout consisting of a few omnibus categories, defies belief. The danger in 
compressing these highly complex issues into a ready-made formula consists in 
letting syntactical relations between words confiscate the place of social relations 
between people. 
For as the Empire of Civil Society did not provide a critique of Realism, but 
rather a Marxist explanation for the categories of Realism to hold in capitalist 
modernity, so does UCD not overthrow the transhistorical categories of 
Neorealism and its structural-functionalist mode of explanation, but adds another 
set of a-historical abstractions and another structural-functionalist mode of 
explanation, this time more sociological, to the Neo-Realist geopolitical categories. 
UCD remains therefore trapped in the same scientistic logic it was meant to 
replace. General theories in the social sciences, normally of a structuralist type, 
are always seductive since they immediately hold out the prospect of providing 
facile and encompassing formulas – eternal truths of universal reach - which are 
easily comprehensible and require only application to different cases. What these 
panoptical delusions fail to grasp is the difference that people make. The “Two 
Marxisms” still haunt the “international imagination”. 
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Conclusion: Recalling the Promise of Historical Sociology for IR 
This article has argued that the debate in IR/HS revolves centrally around 
the divide between structuralist/scientistic and historicist approaches, which cuts 
across the Marxist/non-Marxist divide. The former seeks to formulate 
transhistorical or mid-range covering laws, general and abstract categories of 
analyses, objective and structural determinations and imperatives, stable 
ontologies, and essentialised forms of rationalities. It proceeds by reasoning from 
an aprioristic set of axiomatics. The latter pursues the historicisation of situated 
socio-political practices, the specification of historically concrete concepts of 
analyses and ontologies, and the study of contextualised rationalities and inter-
subjectivities. This includes also a constant historicisation of the construction of 
theories, methods and disciplines. In this respect, the fundamental divide that 
distinguishes approaches in IR/HS does not run between Marxist and non-Marxist 
approaches, but between scientistic and historicist conceptions of social science, 
which the idea of the “Two Marxisms” once expressed and which the post-
positivist debate in IR keeps problematising. Consequently, Neo-Realism, 
rationalist Neo-Weberian HS, and UCD share a structuralist and positivist meta-
theoretical orientation (even when they emphasise different structures that govern 
the law-like behaviour of states or people), whereas PM in IR, hermeneutic forms 
of Weberianism, Constructivism, and other IR/HS approaches abide by non-
positivist meta-theoretical premises. Whereas the former are directed towards 
generalisations, the latter are directed towards specification. 
This divide manifests itself acutely in relation to the second central 
analytical problem, which this article pursued across the controversies and 
intellectual terrain covered, namely the question of methodology for IR/HS. This 
was expressed in the long-standing problem of how to widen our perspective from 
“methodological nationalism” plus “linearity” to an “methodological 
internationalism” plus “multi-linearity” without either relapsing into a (capitalist) 
“methodological universalism”, which reduced multi-linearity to global 
homogeneity, or subjecting multi-linearity to a supra-sociological geopolitical 
structuralism, which pressed isomorphically towards a new uni-linearity – multiple 
but homogeneous conflict-units. Neo-Realism resolved this issue by simply 
drawing an analytical rubicon between “system-level” and “unit-level”, which 
posited a transhistorical “methodological internationalism”, encapsulated in 
anarchy, but artificially severed the relation between international systemic 
imperatives and domestic social processes. This was complemented, by theoretical 
fiat, with a radical disavowal that history (temporality) mattered for the 
“autonomous” and “transhistorical” sphere of international relations, characterised 
by the recursive and necessitous. In short, it decoupled temporality from spatiality, 
froze history and posited an international ontology. Neorealism built its claim to 
constitute an IR theory on these premises and has, ever since, dismissed all 
alternative ways to conceptualise international relations for not conforming to its 
definition of IR Theory – and, consequently, not constituting IR theory. Inter-
spatiality overwhelmed time. 
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Classical Marxism resolved this issue by either positing a spaceless 
stagism (succession of modes-of-production), or by positing a “methodological 
nationalism” which inflated itself over time – world-market formation, bourgeois 
world society, the universalisation of the capital relation - into a “methodological 
universalism”, discounting inter-spatiality. Time overwhelmed space. Neo-
Weberianism resolved this issue by positing an a “methodological internationalism” 
(spatiality) and by relating multi-linearity to the differential institutional resolutions 
of the conjunction between geopolitical systemic imperatives and the domestic 
presence or absence of capitalism (temporality). In the process, it re-aligned itself 
with Neo-Realism, as the international level (the inter-state system) was simply 
posited and transhistoricised as geopolitical fragmentation, whose military 
imperatives reduced multi-linearity to tri-linearity, which itself converged, driven 
by the logic of survival, towards uni-linearity: the successful modern capitalist 
nation-state. Multi-linear spatiality (variations in state-trajectories) was ultimately 
temporally homogenised. Inter-spatiality overwhelmed time. UCD posited a 
transhistorical and ontological notion of development (temporality), which 
generated a sociological and trans-historical definition of “methodological 
internationalism”, defined as the “ontological international” (spatiality). This drove 
a transhistorical process of interactive multi-linearity, which generated socio-
political heterogeneity through unevenness and combination. Inter-spatiality and 
time remain mutually reinforcing. Time cannot overcome space and space cannot 
overcome time. 
All four approaches are united in their de-historicisation and de-
socialisation of political geography (spatiality) and development (temporality). 
Neo-Realism, Neo-Weberianism, and UCD posit a “methodological internationalism” 
as a generic feature of the human condition. Marx remained trapped in an 
oscillation between the national and the universal. And since in Neo-Realism, 
temporality is discounted, in Neo-Weberianism transitory, and in UCD a given, 
history has no effect on political geography as long as “the international” is 
defined as more-than-one. At this level of abstraction, one and the same method, 
premised on the inside/outside divide, can be super-imposed on a stable 
numerical but not substantive political geography and, in the case of UCD, a 
stable idea of development. This article has suggested that the ontologisation of 
the world obfuscates the historicity of spatiality and temporality, respectively 
political geography and development. For even as the world was always already 
numerically composed of plural political communities, which develop and combine, 
this tells us little about their respective social relations, political geographies, inter- 
and intra-relations, and temporalities. And since we cannot articulate anything 
meaningful in the abstract about these phenomena, we cannot impose a generic 
inside/outside and development methodology, premised on the 
nationalism/internationalism binary, on these historically distinctive political 
communities and political geographies. The problem of “methodological 
nationalism” has its own historicity. The international is a relational and therewith 
historical category – in this case the relations between territorially delimited 
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nation-states. Other political geographies, most tellingly nomadic-tribal, 
civilisational, polis-federations, feudal-medieval, leagues of city-states, dynastic, 
imperial (recall the distinction between formal and informal empire), do not share 
this kind of spatiality and relations. The problem of the internal/external duality of  
appears at that moment in time, when an inter-state order crystallised and 
became itself a false dichotomy ab initio, as the capitalist nation-state never 
contained its social relations territorially. Rather than positing a purely quantitative 
“international ontology”, we need to grasp inversely and qualitatively the historical 
uniqueness and specificity of the attempt to render social relations and political 
rule spatially congruent in one unified territory – sovereignty. We also need to 
recall the many strategies of territorialisation and de-territorialisation – closed 
trading state, autarchy, Lebensraum, supra-national integration, formal and 
informal empire, hegemony – that litter the long history of capitalist territoriality 
and the management of geopolitical space. And rather than positing a generic 
notion of development, we also need to recuperate inversely a sense of the 
historical uniqueness of capitalism – a sense that bedevilled Marx, for one - as the 
only form of socio-economic organisation - however exploitative, crisis-ridden, 
manic, and unjust - capable of generating growth and development on a 
historically unprecedented scale. 
The attempt to move from an inter-disciplinary dialogue between IR and 
HS to a synthetic super-discipline of IHS valid for universal history is, for the time 
being, arrested. For any attempt to formulate macro-structuralist conceptions of 
world history, which press the rich variety of historically diverse political 
geographies into a single covering law, contravenes the original promise of IR’s 
three-decade long turn to HS. Rather than founding another meta-discipline, 
which replaces Neorealism’s eternal categories with yet another set of eternal 
categories, the vista is now cleared for a more productive return to this promise. 
This promise held the de-naturalisation, historicisation, socialisation, and 
subversion of geopolitical practices and concepts as contests over human affairs 
and life-chances. And, rather than to deplore their tragic, impersonal, and law-like 
nature, to criticise and resist them. 
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